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ABSTRACT—Ordinary citizens are being arrested and prosecuted for 
recording police conduct in several states. These arrests are being made 
pursuant to state wiretapping statutes that prohibit the recording of any 
communication without the consent of all parties. Some of those arrested 
have filed lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the arrests violate the 
First Amendment. However, courts have tended to dismiss these suits, 
arguing that the right to record the police is not “clearly established.” This 
Comment argues that the right to monitor the police and report misconduct 
is a clearly established, if not fundamental, element of American policing. It 
also maintains that arresting and prosecuting individuals who record police 
conduct constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. It 
concludes by arguing that judicial decisions rendering the recording of 
police unquestionably legal would not undermine police efforts. 
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Advice to a Young Policeman[:] . . . Your acts will at all times be 
subject to the observation and the animadversion of the public, and on 
the stand-point where you commence, and on the course which you 
pursue, depends not only much of the welfare of the community in 
which you move, but the credit of the department to which you belong, 
and your own success as an officer and a man.† 
INTRODUCTION 
“Get off the motorcycle! Get off the motorcycle! Get off the 
motorcycle! State Police . . . put your hands up!”1 off-duty Maryland State 
Trooper J.D. Uhler yelled as he jumped out of his car, pulled out his gun, 
and ran towards motorcyclist Anthony Graber.2 Trooper Uhler exited his 
 
†  EDWARD H. SAVAGE, POLICE RECORDS AND RECOLLECTIONS; OR, BOSTON BY DAYLIGHT AND 
GASLIGHT FOR TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY YEARS 341 (Boston, John P. Dale & Co. 1873). 
1
  Anthony Graber, Motorcycle Traffic Violation—Cop Pulls Out Gun, YOUTUBE (Mar. 10, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BHjjF55M8JQ [hereinafter Graber Video I]. 
2
  Peter Hermann, Judge Says Man Within Rights to Record Police Traffic Stop—Charges Alleging 
Wire Tap Violation Thrown Out, BALT. SUN (Sept. 27, 2010), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-09-
27/news/bs-md-recorded-traffic-stop-20100927_1_police-officers-plitt-cell-phones; see also Graber 
Video I, supra note 1 (Graber’s footage of his initial interaction with Trooper Uhler); Anthony Graber, 
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personal vehicle wearing street clothes and, without displaying his badge, 
lunged towards Graber with his .40 caliber semiautomatic pistol readied.3 
Graber, a twenty-four-year-old sergeant in the Maryland Air National 
Guard,4 was not without a weapon of his own5: he was recording the entire 
interaction using a helmet-mounted video camera.6 
Graber admits—and his camera proves—that he was speeding and 
driving his motorcycle in a reckless manner,7 posing a serious risk both to 
himself and to other motorists. Trooper Uhler’s reaction to the situation was 
therefore not necessarily unreasonable, although his interaction with Graber 
may have initially been more aggressive than was necessary.8 Either way, 
Graber’s story does not end with a mere moving violation. 
On March 10, 2010, five days after being pulled over by Trooper 
Uhler, Graber uploaded the footage he recorded of the incident to 
YouTube.9 The Maryland State Police discovered the video on March 15, 
201010 and charged Graber with violating Maryland’s wiretapping laws.11 
Had Graber been charged only with motor vehicle violations, he would 
 
Motorcycle Traffic Violation—Cop Pulls Out Gun (Extended @o Sound), YOUTUBE (Mar. 10, 2010), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G7PC9cZEWCQ&NR=1 [hereinafter Graber Video II] (Graber’s 
footage of riding his motorcycle and his initial interaction with Trooper Uhler with no sound). These are 
the actual videos posted by Graber on March 10, 2010 that caused him to be arrested and face sixteen 
years in prison. 
3
  See Graber Video I, supra note 1. Maryland state troopers carry the Beretta Px4 Storm, “a .40 
caliber semi-automatic pistol.” Press Release, Md. State Police, State Police Choosing New Model 
Beretta Pistol to Replace Sidearm That Is More Than 10 Years Old (May 8, 2008), available at http://
icac.mdsp.org/media/press_release_details.asp?identifier=614. 
4
  Hermann, supra note 2. 
5
  See Lisa A. Skehill, Note, Cloaking Police Misconduct in Privacy: Why the Massachusetts Anti-
Wiretapping Statute Should Allow for the Surreptitious Recording of Police Officers, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 981, 1005–06 (2009) (“Lacking the right to . . . record [police], citizens are left without a major 
weapon in combating police misconduct.”). 
6
  Hermann, supra note 2; see also Graber Video I, supra note 1 (posting of recorded video); Graber 
Video II, supra note 2 (same). 
7
  P.J. Orvetti, Time to Cut the Wiretap Law: 1970s Law Doesn’t Fit Modern Times, NBC 4 WASH. 
D.C. (June 16, 2010, 11:30 AM), http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Time-to-Cut-the-Wiretap-
Law-96470009.html. 
8
  See Annys Shin, From YouTube to Your Local Court: Video of Traffic Stop Sparks Debate on 
Whether Police Are Twisting Md. Wiretap Laws, WASH. POST, June 16, 2010, at A1 (stating that when 
Trooper Uhler realized that Graber did not pose a threat of fight or flight, he lowered and secured his 
firearm); id. (reporting that state police spokesman believed Uhler “acted appropriately”). 
9
  See id.; Carlos Miller, Motorcyclist Jailed for 26 Hours for Videotaping Gun-Wielding Cop, PIXIQ 
(Apr. 16, 2010, 2:46 AM), http://www.pixiq.com/article/maryland-motorcyclist-spends-26-hours-in-jail-
on-wiretapping-charge-for-filming-cop-with-gun. 
10
  Miller, supra note 9 (providing image of “Application for Statement of Charges”). 
11
  State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *1, *4 (Md. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 
2010) (citing MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-402(a)(1)–(2), 10-403(a) (LexisNexis 2010)); 
Miller, supra note 9. 
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have faced a maximum fine of $2090;12 but adding the wiretapping 
violations meant he faced those fines and up to sixteen years in prison.13 
A warrant was issued and six police officers raided Graber’s home at 
6:45 AM14 on April 15, 2010.15 The search lasted ninety minutes, during 
which the police did not allow Graber’s mother to leave for work or his 
sister to go to school.16 The officers seized four computers, several external 
hard drives and USB drives, and the camera Graber used to film his 
interaction with Trooper Uhler.17 The search would have concluded with an 
arrest of Graber had he not been physically unable to leave his home due to 
recent gall bladder surgery.18 Graber turned himself in to police a week later 
and, after spending twenty-six hours in jail, was released by a judge who 
was skeptical that Graber actually violated Maryland’s wiretapping 
statutes.19 
The applicable Maryland wiretapping statute makes it illegal to 
“[w]illfully intercept, [or] endeavor to intercept . . . any wire, oral, or 
electronic communication”20 and to “[w]illfully disclose, or endeavor to 
disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic 
communication . . . .”21 The police applied the statute to Graber’s case 
because Maryland’s wiretapping statute prohibits interception unless all 
 
12
  MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 27-101(g)(3) (providing a maximum fine of $1000 for a conviction 
of reckless driving under TRANSP. § 21-901.1(a)); Schedule of Pre-Set Fines and/or Penalty Deposits, 
MD. JUDICIARY 46, http://www.courts.state.md.us/district/selfhelp/dccr090chargeonly.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2012) (stating that violations of TRANSP. § 21-801(a) are subject to a $90 fine). Graber was 
charged with two counts of violating TRANSP. § 21-901.1 and one count of violating TRANSP. § 21-
801(a). Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *1. 
13
  See Adam Cohen, Should Videotaping the Police Really Be a Crime?, TIME (Aug. 4, 2010), 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2008566,00.html. Graber was charged with two counts 
of violating CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(a), each punishable by up to five years in prison, one count of 
violating CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-403(a), also punishable by up to five years in prison, and one count of 
violating TRANSP. § 21-1126, punishable by up to one year in prison. See CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-
402(b); TRANSP. § 27-101(z); Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *1. 
14
  David Rittgers, Wiretap Law @eeds Update, BALT. SUN, June 1, 2010, at A13. 
15
  Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *5. 
16
  Rittgers, supra note 14. 
17
  Id.; Shin, supra note 8. 
18
  Shin, supra note 8. 
19
  See Rittgers, supra note 14 (“The penalty [for violating Maryland wiretapping laws] can be up to 
five years in prison and up to a $10,000 fine. When the prosecutor asked for a $15,000 bond for a 
$10,000 crime, the judge questioned both this maneuver and the use of the law against Mr. Graber.”); 
Shin, supra note 8. 
20
  MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2010). 
21
  Id. § 10-402(a)(2). The Maryland wiretapping provisions only apply to audio recordings, not to 
the video itself. State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *6 (Md. Cir. Ct. Sept. 
27, 2010) (citing Ricks v. State, 520 A.2d 1136, 1139 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987)). A video recording 
without sound would therefore not be subject to prosecution under Maryland law. 
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parties consent to it.22 This application is questionable for two reasons. First, 
the same statute provides an exception to the all-party consent rule for 
police officers if, among other things, the officer is a party to the 
conversation.23 Allowing the police a right expressly denied to the public in 
the absence of a compelling governmental interest is prima facie 
discrimination. Second, the Maryland provision defines “oral 
communication” as “any conversation or words spoken to or by any person 
in private conversation,”24 and an interaction with a public servant in a 
public space can hardly be considered “private.” In fact, Judge Emory Plitt 
explicitly stated this in dismissing Graber’s charges: “Those of us who are 
public officials and are entrusted with the power of the state are ultimately 
accountable to the public. When we exercise that power in public fora, we 
should not expect our actions to be shielded from public observation.”25 
Anthony Graber’s case presents an extreme example of how far police 
and prosecutors are willing to go to prevent the recording and dissemination 
of police conduct; however, all-party consent wiretapping statutes are 
similarly, albeit less dramatically, misused elsewhere in the United States.26 
In Massachusetts, Simon Glik used his cell phone to record police making 
an arrest, only to find himself in handcuffs for allegedly violating the state’s 
wiretapping statutes.27 In Pennsylvania, police arrested eighteen-year-old 
 
22
  § 10-402(c)(3) (“It is lawful under this subtitle for a person to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic 
communication where the person is a party to the communication and where all of the parties to the 
communication have given prior consent to the interception . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
In a shockingly public admission of abuse of prosecutorial discretion, prosecutor Joseph Cassilly 
stated that he refused to dismiss the charges against Graber to highlight the undesirability of an all-party 
consent requirement in the hopes that the Maryland Legislature would repeal the provision. See 
Recording the Police: Is Citizen Journalism Against the Law?, CATO INST. at 23:27 (Sept. 22, 2010), 
http://www.cato.org/event.php?eventid=7427 [hereinafter CATO Video] (statement of Joseph I. Cassilly, 
State’s Attorney, Harford County, Maryland). 
23
  § 10-402(c)(4)(i) (listing the requirements for the law enforcement officer exception). The statute 
does not provide an exception for law enforcement officials to disseminate the recording as Graber did 
by posting the videos on the Internet. See id. § 10-401(2)(i). However, the recorded conversation should 
still fall outside the statute because interactions between members of the public and police officers are 
not private. See infra note 25 and accompanying text. 
24
  § 10-401(2)(i) (emphasis added). 
25
  Graber, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *35; see also id. at *17–20 (elaborating on this 
conclusion). 
26
  See, e.g., Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010); Banks v. Gallagher, No. 
3:08-1110, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55308 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2010); Matheny v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 
No. 09-1070, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24189 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2010); Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. 
Supp. 2d 534 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963 (Mass. 2001); Commonwealth 
v. Glik, No. 0701-CR-6687, (Bos. Mun. Ct. Jan. 31, 2008), available at http://www.volokh.com/files/
glik.pdf. Thirteen states require both parties to consent to the recording. Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive 
Image Capture and the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right to Record, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 335, 358 & n.76 (2011). 
27
  John M. Guilfoil, ACLU Files Suit over Cellphone Video of Police, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 1, 2010, 
6:51 PM), http://www.boston.com/news/local/breaking_news/2010/02/_wwwbostoncomne.html. 
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Brian Kelly under the state’s felony wiretapping statute for recording a 
routine traffic stop.28 In New Hampshire, a disorderly conduct allegation 
turned into a Class B felony wiretapping charge with a potential seven-year 
prison sentence29 when police discovered a video recording of their arrival 
at a house party on twenty-year-old partygoer Adam Whitman’s cell 
phone.30 
Why are the police31 pursuing citizen videographers so aggressively? 
The most likely reason is that police officers fear the potentially damaging32 
effect video footage can have on their reputation,33 efficacy,34 and safety.35 
This fear is exacerbated by the increasing prevalence of technology36 that 
makes it possible to simultaneously capture and edit high-quality videos 
and then subsequently disseminate them on the Internet.37 As a result, 
“[p]ervasive new camera and video technologies and social networking 
practices are creating a new generation of media producers [and] 
 
28
  Matt Miller, He’s Cleared in Police Taping—DA Drops Charge Stemming from Carlisle Traffic 
Stop, Declares @ew County Policy, PATRIOT-NEWS (Pa.), June 21, 2007, at A1. Kelly sat in jail for 
twenty-six hours and was only released when his mother posted her home as security for his $2500 bail. 
Id. This case and the Third Circuit’s reasoning in his appeal are discussed in detail infra Part II.B. 
29
  In New Hampshire, Class B felonies are subject to a punishment of up to seven years in prison. 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:2(II)(a) (LexisNexis 2011). 
30
  Editorial, @o Police Scrutiny; Drop the Camera and Back Away, UNION LEADER (N.H.), July 13, 
2010, at A8. 
31
  The terms “police,” “law enforcement officials,” “government actors,” and “government agents” 
are used interchangeably to reflect general usage and because the analysis herein applies to any 
individual acting under federal, state, or local law. 
32
  But see infra Parts IV.C–D (arguing that the potential damage police officers perceive is either 
exaggerated or mitigable). 
33
  E.g., Andrew John Goldsmith, Policing’s @ew Visibility, 50 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 914, 930 
(2010) (“New citizen-controlled media technologies and their associated social uses have meant the 
seeds of scandal-mongering and reputational damage have been cast much more widely, posing a huge 
reputational threat to contemporary police organizations.”). 
34
  See, e.g., Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1163 (2000) (“Personal 
experiences and popular images of police brutality or prejudice only confirm widely held suspicions, 
solidifying distrust on both an individual and group level. In turn, community distrust of the police 
imposes two very real costs on the criminal justice system. First, members of distrusting communities 
will shy away from cooperation with law enforcement, withholding valuable information or creative 
solutions to social ills. Second, distrusting individuals are less likely to obey legal commands.”). 
35
  E.g., Brief of Appellees at 7, Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-
8199-J), 1999 WL 33618059, at *7 (arguing that police officers fear for their physical safety if they 
“constantly hav[e] to look over their shoulder[s] to see where” a videographer is standing and what he is 
doing); Kreimer, supra note 26, at 357 & n.74 (“Officers dislike being recorded in embarrassing 
situations and may be concerned that dissemination of their images may put them at risk of retaliation.”). 
36
  See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 33, at 915–16. This technology is predominantly sophisticated 
mobile phones. See, e.g., David Pogue, @ew iPhone Conceals Sheer Magic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2011, 
at B1 (describing the ability of the iPhone 4S to take high-definition video clips and subsequently upload 
them to the Internet). 
37
  Pogue, supra note 36. 
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consumers, contributing to a ‘disappearance of disappearances’ and thus to 
a ‘new visibility’ in policing.”38 
While this concern is understandable, preventing citizens from 
recording and publishing police conduct is an unconstitutional “prior 
restraint” on speech.39 And, although restraining the speech of those wishing 
to record police conduct has been litigated, courts have failed to reach a 
consensus regarding its constitutionality.40 Existing scholarship argues that 
the First Amendment prohibits the police from restricting a person’s right to 
record them.41 However, the First Amendment doctrine of prior restraint, a 
cousin of freedom of the press,42 has yet to be explored. This Comment 
argues that the doctrine of prior restraint can and should be employed to 
protect the right of citizens to record police conduct.43 
Part I provides basic background on state and federal wiretapping 
statutes and discusses the ways police conduct can be recorded. Part II 
outlines how courts currently analyze the right and why they should hold 
 
38
  Goldsmith, supra note 33, at 915 (citation omitted). 
39
  “Prior restraint” refers to a “governmental restriction on speech or publication before its actual 
expression.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1314 (9th ed. 2009). A prior restraint arises in this context by 
publicly and repeatedly punishing speech after it is shared, leading to a reluctance by members of the 
public to engage in it, and, ultimately, in its suppression. See infra Part III.D. 
40
  See infra Parts II.A–B. This is largely because courts are able to avoid constitutional analysis in 
light of recent Supreme Court decisions regarding qualified immunity. See infra Parts II.A–B. 
41
  See infra Part II.C.3 (listing scholarship that cites the rights to free speech, a free press, 
expressive conduct, and redress grievances as reasons the police should not stop citizens from recording 
them). 
42
  Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 650–51 
(1955) (“In England—the immediate source of our doctrine of prior restraint—printing first developed 
under royal sponsorship and soon became a monopoly to be granted by the Crown.”). 
43
  Although the relationship between a citizen recorder, his audience, and police officers is 
complex, differences in the form of the recorded conversation (e.g., whether the recording was first 
party or third party, stored or disseminated, or on a smartphone or a camcorder) do not change the 
underlying constitutional permissibility of citizens recording police conduct. Nor does the timing of a 
police officer’s interference (i.e., before, during, or after the recording, or even after the recording has 
been publicly disseminated), see also infra Part III, or the form it takes (e.g., verbal request, request 
accompanied by threats of imprisonment or violence, or actual imprisonment or violence) change the 
analysis. Situations that would change the analysis include those involving legitimate interference in the 
officer’s duties (i.e., those that place either the officer or the recorder in danger of physical harm); and 
situations that occur in locations where the officer has a reasonable expectation of privacy (e.g., a police 
station). See Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 84 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[P]eaceful recording of an arrest in a 
public space that does not interfere with the police officers’ performance of their duties is not reasonably 
subject to [First Amendment time, place, and manner] limitation[s].”); id. (“In such traditional public 
spaces [as Boston Common], the rights of the state to limit the exercise of First Amendment activity are 
‘sharply circumscribed.’” (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983))); see also McKenna v. City of Philadelphia, No. 07-CV-110, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76766, at 
*33–34 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2008) (finding that a police sergeant did not violate a plaintiff’s First 
Amendment rights when, as a rule, he allowed filming in a police station’s “public area” but not the 
“operations room” that housed “civilians, juveniles[,] . . . undercover police officers[,] . . . paperwork, 
equipment[,] and assignments”). 
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that it is “clearly established.” Part II also summarizes current academic 
literature on the subject. Part III defines the doctrine of prior restraint, traces 
its relevant development through the American court system, and applies it 
to police officers preventing citizens from recording their actions. Finally, 
Part IV examines the policy justifications for allowing the public to record 
and disseminate footage of police conduct. 
I. BACKGROUND 
“Wiretapping” is a modern form of eavesdropping44 whereby a third 
party intercepts and records a communication between two or more 
parties.45 The practice is so named because the communications recorded 
originally took place via electric telephone wires that needed to be “tapped” 
for the recording to take place.46 The statutory definition of “wiretapping” 
has expanded with advances in technology to include intercepting wireless 
and oral communications.47 This Part presents an overview of wiretapping 
jurisprudence to demonstrate why using all-party consent wiretapping 
statutes to prosecute individuals for recording police conduct constitutes 
their fundamental misuse. 
A. Federal Wiretapping Jurisprudence 
Wiretapping has long been outlawed in many states,48 largely due to 
concerns that it violates individuals’ right to privacy and their right to be 
left alone.49 These concerns gave rise to pivotal Fourth and Fifth 
 
44
  “Eavesdropping” is the “act of secretly listening to the private conversation of others without 
their consent.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 588 (9th ed. 2009); see also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 
41, 45 (1967) (“Eavesdropping is an ancient practice . . . . At one time the eavesdropper listened by 
naked ear under the eaves of houses or their windows, or beyond their walls seeking out private 
discourse.”). 
45
  See Robert F. Scoular, Wiretapping and Eavesdropping Constitutional Development from 
Olmstead to Katz, 12 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 513, 513 (1968). 
46
  See Berger, 388 U.S. at 46 (“The telephone brought on a new and more modern eavesdropper 
known as the ‘wiretapper.” Interception was made by a connection with a telephone line.”); Margaret 
Lybolt Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 73, 73 (1947) (“Wire tapping involves 
first a physical interference with wires before the act of listening or interception of messages occurs.”). 
47
  The modern definition of “electronic communication” is “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, 
images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, 
electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign commerce,” 18 
U.S.C. § 2510(12) (2006); an “oral communication” is “any oral communication uttered by a person 
exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances 
justifying such expectation.” Id. § 2510(2). 
48
  For example, wiretapping has been prohibited in the state of Washington since 1893. WASH. REV. 
CODE § 6559 (1893), reprinted in E. D. MCLAUGHLIN ET AL., THE REVISED STATUTES AND CODES OF 
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 1070 (1896). 
49
  See Scoular, supra note 45, at 515–16 (discussing the arguments presented in the “first 
wiretapping case before the United States Supreme Court”); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 
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Amendment questions in the early twentieth century when law enforcement 
officials began eavesdropping and using wiretaps without warrants to gather 
evidence for criminal investigations.50 In 1928, the Supreme Court 
confronted the Fourth Amendment questions in Olmstead v. United States 
but declined to interpret the Fourth Amendment in such a way as to limit 
law enforcement’s use of warrantless wiretapping.51 
In the wake of Olmstead, wiretapping by law enforcement officials 
continued unimpeded until the 1960s.52 By then, technological 
advancements such as smaller microphones and the ability to remotely 
activate recording devices had greatly expanded the depth and breadth of 
observation capabilities,53 increasing instances of wiretapping by members 
of the public54 and law enforcement officials alike.55 This dilution of 
privacy—in particular, the growing use of wiretapping by law enforcement 
officials—troubled the Warren Court and was likely the impetus behind its 
1967 decision in Katz v. United States, which overruled Olmstead and held 
that wiretapping constituted a search or seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment.56 In Katz, law enforcement officials observed Charles Katz 
making calls from a specific public telephone booth at regular intervals and, 
suspecting illegal activity, taped microphones to the outside of the booth to 
record his conversations.57 The recorded conversations revealed that Katz 
was calling a known gambler in Massachusetts58 and were subsequently 
 
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as 
against the Government, the right to be let alone . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
50
  See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456–57 (majority opinion). 
51
  Id. at 463–64, 466 (holding that listening to the suspect’s telephone calls was not an 
unconstitutional search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment because listening to a telephone 
conversation does not constitute a physical trespass). The Court may have reached this decision, at least 
in part, because the case involved a suspected bootlegger and arose in the context of Prohibition 
enforcement, id. at 455–56, thus placing political pressure on the Court to avoid removing tools from 
law enforcement. See RICHARD F. HAMM, OLMSTEAD V. U@ITED STATES: THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGES OF PROHIBITION ENFORCEMENT 1–2 (Fed. Jud. Ctr. ed. 2010), http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/olmstead.pdf/$file/olmstead.pdf. 
52
  Carol M. Bast, What’s Bugging You? Inconsistencies and Irrationalities of the Law of 
Eavesdropping, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 837, 840 (1998) (“Private individuals and law enforcement officers, 
at both the federal and the state levels, made extensive use of wiretapping and electronic surveillance 
during the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, 1950s, and most of the 1960s until Congress passed legislation 
curtailing the practices in 1968.”). 
53
  See Scoular, supra note 45. 
54
  See, e.g., Stacy L. Mills, Note, He Wouldn’t Listen to Me Before, But @ow . . . : Interspousal 
Wiretapping and an Analysis of State Wiretapping Statutes, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 415, 415 & n.4 (1999) 
(discussing the “alarming number” of instances of spousal wiretapping). 
55
  Bast, supra note 52, at 840–41. 
56
  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Bast, supra note 52, at 841. 
57
  Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 131 (9th Cir. 1966). 
58
  Brief for the Respondent, Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (No. 35), 1967 WL 113606, at *3. 
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entered into evidence at trial, where the judge convicted59 him of 
“transmitting wagering information by telephone.”60 The Supreme Court 
overturned Katz’s conviction61 and held that recording his conversations 
violated the Fourth Amendment because Katz intended to keep them private 
and had the constitutional right to do so.62 Justice Harlan’s concurrence 
outlined what would become the two-part requirement guiding 
constitutional protection of private conversations: (1) “a person [must] have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” and (2) “the 
expectation [must] be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”63 
Congress codified Justice Harlan’s manifestation of protected private 
conversations in Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968,64 which requires law enforcement officials to either be a party 
to a conversation or obtain the consent of either party before intercepting 
private communications without a warrant.65 If neither consent nor a valid 
warrant is obtained, any evidence extracted may be inadmissible in court,66 
and the interception may subject the eavesdropper to criminal penalties and 
civil damages.67 For “person[s] not acting under color of law,”68 however, 
the Act permits recording with the consent of just one party to the 
communication.69 These regulations were meant to “protect the ‘cherished 
 
59
  Katz, 369 F.2d at 131–32, 136. The district court conviction was rendered by a judge in a nonjury 
trial. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 58, at *2. 
60
  Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
61
  Id. at 359. 
62
  Id. at 351–53. 
63
  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
64
  See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 801, 82 Stat. 
197, 211–14 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2006)); see also Stephen Linzer, Federal Procedure for 
Court Ordered Electronic Surveillance: Does It Meet the Standards of Berger and Katz?, 60 J. CRIM. L. 
CRIMINOLOGY & POL. SCI. 203, 207 (1969) (“[The 1968 Act] represents a permissive scheme of court 
ordered electronic surveillance while complying with the Supreme Court decisions in Berger and Katz. 
It has two fundamental purposes: protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications and 
delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire 
and oral communications may be authorized.” (footnotes omitted)). 
65
  § 2511(2)(c) (“It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to 
intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a party to the communication 
or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception.”). 
66
  See id. § 2518(9)–(10). 
67
  Id. § 2511(4)(a). 
68
  Id. § 2511(2)(d) (emphasis added). “The term [color of law] usu[ally] implies a misuse of power 
made possible because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of the state.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 302 (9th ed. 2009); see also § 2510(7) (“‘Investigative or law enforcement officer’ means 
any officer of the United States or of a State or political subdivision thereof, who is empowered by law 
to conduct investigations of or to make arrests for offenses . . . .”). 
69
  Id. § 2511(2)(d) (“It shall not be unlawful . . . for a person not acting under color of law to 
intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or 
where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception . . . .”). 
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privacy of law-abiding citizens,’”70 and Congress felt this responsibility was 
best left to the states.71 Therefore, the Act itself created a baseline of privacy 
protection, leaving states to fill in the details and craft wiretapping laws to 
suit their needs, provided those laws guarantee at least as much protection 
as the federal statute72 and do not violate the Constitution.73 
B. State Wiretapping Jurisprudence 
Following the enactment of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, most states passed statutes that permitted recording 
under the consent of one party to the communication.74 In addition to 
Maryland,75 where Anthony Graber was arrested, twelve states attempted to 
expand this protection by requiring the consent of all parties to a 
communication.76 Factors that help determine whether a party “consented” 
to a recording include whether the recording is in “plain view” or 
surreptitious,77 and whether the recorder is a party to the communication78 or 
 
70
  Skehill, supra note 5, at 990 n.73 (citing Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 250 n.9 (1979)). 
71
  Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 197 
(1968) (“[C]rime is essentially a local problem that must be dealt with by State and local governments if 
it is to be controlled effectively.”). 
72
  Bast, supra note 52, at 845. 
73
  U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”). 
74
  Jesse Harlan Alderman, Police Privacy in the iPhone Era? The @eed for Safeguards in State 
Wiretapping Statutes to Preserve the Civilian’s Right to Record Public Police Activity, 9 FIRST AMEND. 
L. REV. 487 app. at 535–39 (2011) (listing the thirty-four one-party-consent states). 
75
  MD. CODE. ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-401 to -403 (LexisNexis 2010). 
76
  See Alderman, supra note 74, at 496–510 (listing state statutes); Bast, supra note 52, at 927–30 
(same). For the specific language of the statutes, see CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 631–632 (Deering 2010) 
(California); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-187 to -189 (2010) (Connecticut); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, 
§§ 1335, 2401, 2402 (2010) (Delaware); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 934.02 to .03 (LexisNexis 2010) (Florida); 
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/14-1 to -2 (LexisNexis 2010) (Illinois); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, 
§ 99 (LexisNexis 2010) (Massachusetts); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §§ 750.539, 750.539a to .539e 
(LexisNexis 2010) (Michigan); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-213 (2010) (Montana); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 200.610, 200.650 (LexisNexis 2010) (Nevada); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2 (LexisNexis 
2010) (New Hampshire); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 133.721, 133.726, 165.540, 165.542 to .543 (2010) 
(Oregon); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5701–5704 (2010) (Pennsylvania); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9.73.030 (LexisNexis 2010) (Washington). 
77
  See, e.g., Glik v. Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 86–88 (2d Cir. 2011); Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 
F.3d 248, 256, 259 n.7 (3d Cir. 2010); Skehill, supra 5, at 983–84 & n.23; Howard M. Wasserman, 
Orwell’s Vision: Video and the Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 649–51 (2009). 
In Massachusetts, for example, consent is implied if the other party can see the recording device. See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 969 (Mass. 2001) (“The defendant was not prosecuted 
for making the recording; he was prosecuted for doing so secretly.”); id. at 971; Commonwealth v. Glik, 
No. 0701-CR-6687, at 2 (Bos. Mun. Ct. Jan. 31, 2008), available at http://www.volokh.com/
files/glik.pdf. 
78
  See infra text accompanying note 89. 
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a third-party observer.79 All-party consent statutes can be further broken 
down into two categories: (1) statutes that require a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the communication to prohibit recording80 and (2) statutes that 
prohibit recording regardless of whether the parties had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.81 
All-party consent statutes permit—but do not require82—arrest and 
prosecution even if unconsented recording is an individual’s only offense.83 
However, the purpose of all-party consent statutes is to prevent 
“unwarranted spying and intrusions on people’s privacy,”84 not give the 
police an avenue to suppress protected speech; using these statutes to arrest 
and prosecute citizens recording police conduct represents their 
fundamental misuse. All-party consent statutes have also led to other 
unintended consequences.85 For example, for a citizen to protect himself 
from a would-be blackmailer, he would first need to obtain the would-be 
blackmailer’s consent before recording proof of her crime, otherwise the 
citizen would also be guilty of a felony.86 
These all-party consent statutes also contain a logical flaw because 
both parties to a communication always consent to its capture and storage: 
 
79
  CATO Video, supra note 22 (statement of Joseph I. Cassilly, State’s Attorney, Harford County, 
Maryland). 
80
  E.g., MD. CODE. ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-401 to -403 (LexisNexis 2010); 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. §§ 5701–5704 (2010); see also Alderman, supra note 74, at 496–500. 
81
  E.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/14-1 to -2 (LexisNexis 2010); see also Alderman, supra 
note 74, at 496, 500–06. 
82
  Police and prosecutors have nearly limitless, unreviewable discretion in choosing whether to 
arrest or charge someone with a crime. See, e.g., AMY BACH, ORDINARY INJUSTICE: HOW AMERICA 
HOLDS COURT 130 (2009) (“By law and custom, a prosecutor has broad authority in prosecuting 
criminal cases, including the option to “screen out” or decide against pursuing a case at any 
stage. . . . For the most part, th[is] exercise of ‘prosecutorial discretion’ requires no formal process or 
oversight.”); Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion @ot to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility 
Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 543 (1960) (stating that police officers 
may choose not to invoke the criminal process against an individual); Peter Krug, Prosecutorial 
Discretion and Its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643, 645 (2002) (same). 
83
  MD. CODE. ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(b) (LexisNexis 2010) (“Any person who violates 
[§ 10-402(a), the wiretapping prohibition] is guilty of a felony and is subject to imprisonment for not 
more than 5 years or a fine of not more than $ 10,000, or both.”). 
84
  Marianne B. Davis & Laurie R. Bortz, Legislation, The 1977 Maryland Wiretapping and 
Electronic Surveillance Act, 7 U. BALT. L. REV. 374, 384 (1978) (quoting 1973 Md. Laws 1924–25 
(statement of Governor Marvin Mandel)). 
85
  Many well-intentioned laws create unintended consequences. See, e.g., Karen Turnage Boyd, The 
Tale of Two Systems: How Integrated Divorce Laws Can Remedy the Unintended Effects of Pure @o-
Fault Divorce, 12 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 609, 622–24 (2006) (discussing the unintended 
consequences of no-fault divorce laws); Christopher Dinkel, Note, Welfare Family Caps and the Zero-
Grant Situation, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 365, 367–68 (2011) (arguing that welfare laws in California have 
unintentionally prevented otherwise deserving families from receiving much-needed financial 
assistance). 
86
  See CATO Video, supra note 22, at 22:34 (statement of Joseph I. Cassilly, State’s Attorney, 
Harford County, Maryland). 
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when a person chooses to communicate with someone else, they are 
implicitly consenting to the other party receiving the information to 
reference and share at a later point.87 Any time a person communicates 
information to someone else, he risks having that information repeated;88 
that risk of disclosure is not necessarily greater when the person is using a 
recording device. Thus, “sousveillance,” which is “the recording of an 
activity by a participant in the activity,”89 always has the implicit consent of 
all parties.90 
In some states, all-party consent is required only if the parties have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.91 The rationale for this requirement is 
that harm is less likely to occur if the conduct or communication captured 
was never intended to be private.92 Police officers acting within their official 
capacity are generally afforded a diminished expectation of privacy.93 This 
is especially true when the underlying actions involve depriving citizens of 
their freedom. As then-Associate Justice Rehnquist put it: 
An arrest is not a “private” event. An encounter between law enforcement 
authorities and a citizen is ordinarily a matter of public record, and by the very 
 
87
  See id. at 1:06:40 (statement of Joseph I. Cassilly, State’s Attorney, Harford County, Maryland). 
88
  In the immortal words of Benjamin Franklin: “Three may keep a secret, if two of them are dead.” 
TRYON EDWARDS, A DICTIONARY OF THOUGHTS 508 (N.Y., Cassell Publ’g Co. 1891). 
89
  Goldsmith, supra note 33, at 922 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
90
  This remains true even if the sharing party does not know she is being recorded because she is 
still communicating something to another person at the risk of having that person disclose that 
communication. Logically, this risk does not decrease just because the communicator does not know if 
the receiver is actively “remembering” the encounter. 
91
  For example, Pennsylvania requires the consent of both parties for a person not affiliated with 
law enforcement to record a communication. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5704(4) (2010) (providing an 
exception to the all-party consent rule by permitting “[a] person, to intercept a wire, electronic or oral 
communication, where all parties to the communication have given prior consent to such interception”). 
The statute defines “oral communication” as “[a]ny oral communication uttered by a person possessing 
an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying 
such expectation.” Id. § 5702. However, not all Pennsylvania legislators agree with these definitions, 
and on April 21, 2009, House Bill 1308 was introduced in the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, 
suggesting the following changes to section 5704(4): 
A person, to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where . . . the person is a party to 
the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to 
the interception unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any 
criminal or tortious act. 
H.R. 1308, 193d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009) (emphasis in original indicates the proposed 
language change). If passed, this bill would have made Pennsylvania a one-party consent state; instead, 
it died after being introduced to the judiciary committee. Bill Information, Regular Session 2009–2010, 
House Bill 1308, PA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, http://www.legis.state.pa.us/cfdocs/billinfo/bill_history.cfm?
syear=2009&sind=0&body=H&type=B&bn=1308 (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). 
92
  See State v. Forrester, 587 P.2d 179, 184 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978) (“To determine whether or not 
a . . . conversation is private [for the purposes of Washington’s all-party consent wiretapping prohibition 
that requires a reasonable expectation of privacy], the court must consider the intent or reasonable 
expectations of the participants as manifested by the facts and circumstances of each case.”). 
93
  See Wasserman, supra note 77, at 650. 
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definition of the term it involves an intrusion into a person’s bodily integrity. 
To speak of an arrest as a private occurrence seems to me to stretch even the 
broadest definitions of the idea of privacy beyond the breaking point.94 
This is not to say that police officers never have an expectation for privacy 
when engaging with the public, but rather that privacy is the exception, not 
the rule.95 
II. THE RIGHT TO RECORD THE POLICE IS “CLEARLY ESTABLISHED” 
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Qualified Immunity Defense 
A lawsuit brought against a police officer or municipality under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the forum in which the First Amendment right to record 
the police is most likely to be considered by courts.96 Section 1983 provides 
a civil remedy for individuals whose constitutional rights have been 
violated by a person acting under color of law: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 
United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .97 
The individuals being sued—usually government officials such as police 
officers—are entitled to an affirmative defense under the doctrine of 
qualified immunity.98 Immunity will only be granted if properly invoked 
 
94
  William H. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consistent with Fair and Effective Law 
Enforcement?, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 8 (1974). 
95
  Dina Mishra, Comment, Undermining Excessive Privacy for Police: Citizen Tape Recording to 
Check Police Officers’ Power, 117 YALE L.J. 1549, 1555 (2008). Police officers can create an 
expectation of privacy that rightfully should protect the contents of their communications by 
“exercis[ing] some control to protect sensitive investigative or personal information against citizen 
recording by ensuring that they communicate about such information only in their own private spaces, or 
at least out of citizens’ apparent earshot.” Id. at 1556. However, these steps should not be able to shield 
an officer who wishes to verbally or physically assault a suspect because this might encourage more 
active efforts to conceal misconduct. 
96
  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). First Amendment claims can, of course, arise in other contexts. See, 
e.g., Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2007) (permitting dissemination of an Internet 
posting of police conduct after a plaintiff successfully challenged police interference under the 
Massachusetts interception statute); ACLU v. Alvarez, No. 10-C-5235, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2088 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2011) (seeking injunctive relief against Illinois’s eavesdropping statute); 
Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963 (Mass. 2001) (challenging the use of a Massachusetts 
wiretapping statute to prosecute a criminal defendant for recording the police). 
97
  § 1983. 
98
  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982) (“Qualified or ‘good faith’ immunity is an 
affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant official.”); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
818 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “qualified immunity” as “[i]mmunity from civil liability for a public 
official who is performing a discretionary function, as long as the conduct does not violate clearly 
established constitutional or statutory rights”). Qualified immunity is justified because it mitigates the 
106:273  (2012) Citizens Recording Police Conduct 
 287
and if the actor’s “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”99 
Thus, courts can dismiss a case on qualified immunity grounds if: (1) a 
constitutional right was not violated or (2) the right was not clearly 
established.100 
In 2001, the Supreme Court’s decision in Saucier v. Katz required 
courts to first consider the constitutional element, and only if a party 
establishes that a constitutional right was violated were courts to consider 
“whether the right was clearly established.”101 However, the Court quickly 
became convinced that the Saucier sequence was an unworkable and 
unwise approach.102 In Pearson v. Callahan, the Court dramatically shifted 
the way in which courts may analyze the qualified immunity defense.103 
Pearson allows courts to use their “sound discretion” when choosing the 
order in which the qualified immunity factors are considered.104 For citizen 
recorders of police conduct, the outcome was not good. After Pearson, 
federal courts became more likely to declare that the right to record police 
conduct has not been clearly established than they were to engage in a 
constitutional analysis.105 
The precise meaning of “clearly established” is hazy.106 The Court has 
stated that a clearly established right must be “sufficiently clear” and 
 
fear of lawsuits that might otherwise chill or inhibit lawful and necessary actions by state officials. See 
JAMES E. PFANDER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION 227 (2d ed. 2011). 
99
  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
100
  See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
101
  533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). This ordering was important because questions of qualified immunity 
under § 1983 claims may be the only avenue in which a constitutional question could be brought before 
a court. See Sarah Lynn Lochner, Note, Qualified Immunity, Constitutional Stagnation, and the Global 
War on Terror, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 829, 832 (2011) (arguing that constitutional rights for individuals 
being prosecuted or detained as part of the “Global War on Terror” are most readily developed by courts 
under the qualified immunity analysis that follows the Saucier sequence). 
102
  John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 
115, 115–16 & nn.4–5 (citing cases that discuss the burden that “unnecessary merits adjudications” can 
place on courts). 
103
  555 U.S. at 223. 
104
  Id. at 236. 
105
  See, e.g., Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010); Szymecki v. Houck, 
353 F. App’x 852, 853 (4th Cir. 2009); Adkins v. Guam Police Dep’t, No. 09-00029, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 87353, at *28–36 (D. Guam Aug. 24, 2010); Banks v. Gallagher, No. 3:08-1110, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 55308, at *35–36 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 18, 2010); Matheny v. Cnty. of Allegheny, No. 09-1070, 2010 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24189, at *12 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2010); Gravolet v. Tassin, No. 08-3646, 2009 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 45876, at *12–13 (E.D. La. June 2, 2009). The recently decided exception is Glik v. 
Cunniffe, 655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011). 
106
  Eastwood v. Dep’t of Corr., 846 F.2d 627, 630 (10th Cir. 1988) (“Definitions of what constitutes 
a clearly established right have been hazy.”); Charles R. Wilson, “Location, Location, Location”: 
Recent Developments in the Qualified Immunity Defense, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 445, 447–48 
(2000) (“Determining exactly when a right is ‘clearly established’ for qualified immunity purposes is 
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“apparent” such that a reasonable official would know that his actions 
violated a protected right.107 This knowledge can be inferred if the official 
had “fair warning” that his actions violated a person’s constitutional 
rights.108 One way to demonstrate fair warning is to show that a “robust 
consensus of cases of persuasive authority”109 delineates the right “beyond 
debate.”110 Although the Court has failed to suggest a metric for determining 
what constitutes a “robust consensus,”111 it has stated that the absence of 
“materially similar” precedent does not preclude a finding that a right was 
clearly established.112 Therefore courts may look outside intracircuit and 
Supreme Court caselaw to make that finding, just as the Supreme Court 
itself has done.113 Despite the latitude that courts enjoy in deciding whether 
a right is clearly established, nearly every federal court that has decided the 
issue since Pearson has foregone constitutional analysis in favor of holding 
that the right to record police has not been clearly established.114 This is 
unsurprising given that weighing the rights and needs of citizens against 
those of the police is an unenviable task that anyone would justifiably want 
to avoid.115 
 
philosophically complex. . . . [And,] there is remarkably little consensus among the United States circuit 
courts concerning how to interpret the term . . . .”). 
107
  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
108
  Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739–41 (2002). 
109
  Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2011) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 
(1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
110
  Id. at 2083. Justice Scalia’s phrase “beyond debate” is a disappointingly unhelpful contribution 
to the development of the definition of “clearly established.” Failing to provide a metric for making such 
a determination changes the actual words that courts will use in their rulings without affecting the 
outcomes they will ultimately reach or the means by which they arrive at these decisions. More helpful 
would have been examples of what, if anything, places critical constitutional issues beyond debate. 
111
  The First Circuit has suggested that “two closely related” cases may be sufficient to find that a 
right is clearly established. Wilson v. City of Boston, 421 F.3d 45, 57 (1st Cir. 2005). 
112
  Hope, 536 U.S. at 739. 
113
  Id. at 741–42 (looking to an Alabama Department of Corrections regulation and a Department of 
Justice report, in addition to binding precedent, to determine that conduct violated a “clearly 
established” constitutional right); see also Willingham v. Loughnan, 321 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 
2003) (“General statements of the law contained within the Constitution, statute, or caselaw may 
sometimes provide ‘fair warning’ of unlawful conduct.” (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 741)). But see 
Adkins v. Guam Police Dep’t, No. 09-00029, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87353, at *36 (D. Guam Aug. 24, 
2010) (“If the only way to find there is a clearly established right is to look to other circuits for guidance 
then it is likely that the right is not, in fact, clearly established in this circuit.”). 
114
  See supra note 105 (citing opinions by federal courts that have decided the issue). The recent 
First Circuit case Glik v. Cunniffe is an encouraging exception. See 655 F.3d 78, 84–85 (1st Cir. 2011). 
115
  See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) (“In this category of qualified immunity 
cases, a court can enter judgment without ever ruling on the (perhaps difficult) constitutional claim the 
plaintiff has raised. Small wonder, then, that a court might leave that issue for another day.”); Wilson, 
supra note 106, at 447 (“Judges in qualified immunity matters frequently face a series of unappealing 
moral choices, ranging from subjecting a public servant to personal liability for conduct undertaken in 
good faith, to eliminating a potential remedy for a plaintiff who has been subjected to embarrassing and 
degrading conduct.”). 
106:273  (2012) Citizens Recording Police Conduct 
 289
Unfortunately, courts that use their Pearson discretion to avoid 
determining whether a constitutional right exists and then declare that a 
right is not clearly established can do so ad infinitum. This leads to the 
undesirable consequence that a right might never be “established”: 
Officer A contends that the right to videotape police is not clearly established 
and the judge, without deciding if there is such a right, agrees that the law in 
that regard is not clearly established and that Officer A is entitled to qualified 
immunity. Case dismissed. A year later, when you sue Officer B, the judge 
looks at her earlier opinion and sees that the law is no clearer now than it was a 
year ago. Case dismissed. And when you sue Officer C the law is no clearer 
than it was in the previous two cases. Case dismissed. And so on.116 
No standard is articulated and individuals seeking to record police conduct 
are consequently deprived of a framework for determining the limits, if any, 
of their right to do so.117 However, indefinite lack of clarity is not a foregone 
conclusion118 because considerable evidence supports the notion that the 
right to record police conduct—a derivative of the right to observe and 
report on police conduct and misconduct—has been clearly established. 
B. Current Circuit Split 
Both the First and Third Circuits have recently ruled on whether the 
right to record the police is clearly established, each reaching a different 
conclusion: in Glik v. Cunniffe, the First Circuit found the right clearly 
established;119 in Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, the Third Circuit found that it 
was not.120 
1. The First Circuit: Glik v. Cunniffe.—On October 1, 2007, Simon 
Glik noticed three Boston Police officers arresting a man near Boston 
Common.121 When he overheard another bystander say, “You are hurting 
 
116
  Mary Catherine Roper, 3rd Circuit Police Videotaping Case Leaves Uncertainty in Its Wake, 
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 25, 2010, at 7, 7–8.  
117
  E.g., Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2030–31 (explaining that, by failing to address novel issues and 
claims, courts fail to encourage law-abiding behavior in public officials); Jeffries, supra note 102, at 120 
(“Without merits adjudication, the legal rule would remain unclear, and development of the law would 
be forestalled by repeated applications of qualified immunity.”); Roper, supra note 116, at 8 (“If the 
judge never addresses the first step in the Saucier analysis, then the law remains ambiguous and your 
clients remain without protection.”). 
118
  The recent Supreme Court ruling in Camreta v. Greene supports this claim. In Camreta, the 
Court held that the party that wins a qualified immunity defense may still appeal a victory to clarify the 
constitutionality of the challenged actions. 131 S. Ct. at 2030–32. This will have the effect of 
“establishing controlling law” and “promot[ing] clarity—and observance—of constitutional rules.” Id. at 
2030. If lower courts know that a ruling on the constitutionality of a government actor’s conduct can be 
appealed, they might be more likely to engage in at least a minimal explication of constitutional 
standards, thereby making courts more likely to decide, rather than avoid, constitutional issues. 
119
  655 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2011). 
120
  622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010). 
121
  Glik, 655 F.3d at 79. 
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him, stop,” he realized the officers might be using excessive force and 
began recording the arrest with his cell phone.122 As Glik recorded the arrest 
from a distance of approximately ten feet, one of the officers said, “I think 
you have taken enough pictures,” to which Glik replied, “I am recording 
this. I saw you punch him.”123 After this exchange, one of the officers asked 
Glik if his cell phone was recording audio, and when Glik confirmed that it 
was, he was placed under arrest for violating Massachusetts’s all-party 
consent wiretapping statute.124 Glik’s criminal charges for violating the 
wiretapping statute were dismissed by the Boston Municipal Court because 
he made no effort to conceal the fact that he was recording the police and 
therefore did not meet the element of the offense requiring that the 
recording be intentionally secretive.125 
As is its prerogative in qualified immunity analysis, the First Circuit 
chose first to determine whether a First Amendment right to record the 
police exists. Drawing on longstanding Supreme Court precedent, the First 
Circuit held that the First Amendment proscribes laws that abridge an 
individual’s rights to free speech, a free press, and a “range of conduct 
related to the gathering and dissemination of information.”126 The court 
specifically noted that the right to gather and disseminate information 
applies to the media and nearby citizens with cell phone and video cameras 
alike, particularly when that information is of public importance or relates 
to the duties of public officials.127 This right is not unlimited, however, and 
is subject to content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions.128 
Upon finding that the right exists, the First Circuit then found that it 
was clearly established because its ruling in Iacobucci v. Boulter, decided 
nearly a decade before Glik’s arrest,129 “recognized a right to film 
government officials or matters of public interest in public space.”130 The 
First Circuit concluded that Iacobucci, in conjunction with several 
extracircuit cases, led squarely to the conclusion that “a citizen’s right to 
 
122
  Id. at 79–80. Glik is now a practicing attorney in Boston, Massachusetts, having graduated from 
New England Law School in 2006. Simon Glik, About Me, GLIKLAW, http://gliklaw.com/gliklaw/
About_Me.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2012). 
123
  Glik, 655 F.3d at 80 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
124
  Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 99(C)(1) (2011) (prohibiting secretly recording 
another’s conversation)); see also § 99(B)(4) (“The term ‘interception’ means to secretly hear, secretly 
record, or aid another to secretly hear or secretly record the contents of any wire or oral communication 
through the use of any intercepting device by any person other than a person given prior authority by all 
parties to such communication.” (emphases added)). 
125
  Glik, 655 F.3d at 80. 
126
  Id. at 82. 
127
  Id. at 84 (citing Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 25 (1st Cir. 1999)). 
128
  Id. (citing Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000)). Smith is discussed 
in more detail infra Part II.C.1. 
129
  193 F.3d at 14. 
130
  Glik, 655 F.3d at 84–85. 
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film government officials, including law enforcement officers, in the 
discharge of their duties in a public space is a basic, vital, and well-
established liberty safeguarded by the First Amendment.”131 The court 
reached this conclusion despite noting that the Third Circuit came to the 
opposite one in Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle.132 The First Circuit supported 
its holding by distinguishing the facts and context of Simon Glik’s case.133 
But even in the absence of these slightly divergent facts, Kelly is 
unpersuasive because of internal inconsistencies and analytical 
shortcomings. 
2. The Third Circuit: Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle.—In Kelly, 
Officer David Rogers stopped Tyler Shopp for speeding and a bumper-
height violation.134 The plaintiff, Brian Kelly, was Shopp’s passenger and 
had with him a small video camera that he used to record the incident.135 
Toward the end of the encounter, Officer Rogers informed the boys that he 
was recording their conversation, at which point he discovered that Kelly 
was also recording their interaction.136 Believing this to be a violation of 
Pennsylvania’s wiretapping law, Officer Rogers ordered Kelly to turn over 
the camera,137 evidently failing to appreciate the “do as I say, not as I do” 
double standard of the command. After Kelly complied, Officer Rogers 
returned to his patrol car, called an Assistant District Attorney to confirm 
that Kelly’s behavior had violated the wiretapping statute, and arrested and 
detained the teenager for twenty-seven hours.138 
When the charges against him were eventually dropped,139 Kelly filed a 
claim against Officer Rogers and the Borough of Carlisle under § 1983 for 
violating his First Amendment right to record the police.140 Officer Rogers 
and the Borough of Carlisle successfully invoked a qualified immunity 
defense at trial, where the judge held that the right to record the police had 
not been clearly established.141 In affirming the lower court’s ruling, the 
 
131
  Id. at 85 (citing Smith, 212 F.3d at 1333; Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 439 (9th Cir. 
1995)). 
132
  622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010). 
133
  Glik, 655 F.3d at 85. 
134
  622 F.3d at 251. 
135
  Id. 
136
  Id. 
137
  Id. (citing Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 18 PA. CONS. 
STAT. §§ 5701–5782 (2010)). 
138
  Id. at 251–52. 
139
  Id. at 252; see also Miller, supra note 28 (“[Cumberland County District Attorney David] Freed 
said he withdrew the charge after reviewing evidence in the case and state court rulings regarding 
application of the wiretap law.”). 
140
  Kelly, 622 F.3d at 252 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)). Kelly also sued for violation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 252, 254. 
141
  Id. at 252–53 (“The [district] [c]ourt reasoned that . . . it was unclear whether Kelly had a right 
to videotape the police stop . . . .”). 
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Third Circuit reasoned that: (1) the right to record the police had only been 
“hypothesized” by courts in the past,142 (2) cases that support a “general 
right to record matters of public concern” were “insufficiently analogous”143 
to Kelly’s case, and (3) the three on-point cases it cited were numerically 
insufficient to clearly establish the right.144 
Although the Kelly court’s analysis of the “clearly established” prong 
of the qualified immunity defense appears doctrinally plausible, it is 
incomplete for two reasons. First, it cited and then overlooked both Third 
Circuit precedent that calls for a low threshold for concluding that a right is 
clearly established, as well as Supreme Court precedent that allows the 
“clearly established” prong to be satisfied in cases lacking the “exact” same 
set of facts. Second, it largely ignored the context of the issue given the 
facts of Brian Kelly’s case, such as evidence that Officer Rogers actually 
did know of a citizen’s right to record police conduct. 
The Kelly court cited the low threshold for finding a right clearly 
established in the Third Circuit’s opinion in Kopec v. Tate,145 and concluded 
that such a finding could be based solely on the “case law of other 
circuits.”146 It added that, “[alt]hough we have not [yet] had occasion to 
decide this [specific] issue, several other courts have addressed the right to 
record police while they perform their duties.”147 The court then cited three 
cases—one from the Third Circuit,148 one from a district court in 
Pennsylvania,149 and another from the Eleventh Circuit150—that support a 
citizen’s right to record police conduct.151 However, and without adequate 
 
142
  Id. at 260 (quoting Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 212 n.14 (3rd Cir. 2005)). 
143
  Id. at 261–62. 
144
  See id. at 262. 
145
  361 F.3d 772, 778 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[I]t cannot be said as a matter of law that a reasonable officer 
would not have known that his conduct was in violation of [a constitutional right] even though it appears 
that neither the Supreme Court nor [the Third Circuit] has ruled [on the issue].”). 
146
  Kelly, 622 F.3d at 260; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND 
REFORM 376 (1996) (“The tendency in the courts of appeals is to treat Supreme Court decisions and 
decisions of the same circuit as authoritative and to interpret them broadly, but to treat decisions of other 
circuits as no more than persuasive and to interpret them narrowly. I am not sure how sensible this 
pattern is.”). 
147
  Kelly, 622 F.3d at 260. 
148
  Id. (“[V]ideotaping or photographing the police in the performance of their duties on public 
property may be a protected activity.” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 212 
n.14 (3d Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
149
  Id. at 260–61 (“[T]here is a free speech right to film police officers in the performance of their 
public duties.” (citing Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 541 (E.D. Pa. 2005))). 
150
  Id. at 260 (“[There is] a ‘First Amendment right, subject to reasonable time, manner and place 
restrictions, to photograph or videotape police conduct’ . . . . ‘[T]he First Amendment protects the right 
to gather information about what public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to 
record matters of public interest.’” (quoting Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1332–33 (11th 
Cir. 2000))). 
151
  Id. at 260–61. 
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explanation, the court then concluded that these three cases were 
“insufficient” to “put a reasonably competent officer on ‘fair notice’ that 
seizing a camera or arresting an individual for videotaping police during [a 
traffic] stop would violate the First Amendment.”152 
Kelly also favorably cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Hope v. 
Pelzer for the proposition that it is “not necessary” for the “exact set” of 
factual circumstances at issue to have been previously analyzed to find that 
a right is clearly established.153 However, Kelly ultimately refused to follow 
the aforementioned caselaw that supports the “proposition that a general 
right to record matters of public concern has been clearly established”154 
precisely because it was factually distinct from Brian Kelly’s case.155 All 
told, the Kelly court referenced a total of eight cases156 that supported the 
right to record public officials, three of which expressly supported that right 
 
152
  Id. at 262. But see infra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing a case from the District of 
New Jersey cited in Kelly as an example of doctrinal ambiguity). 
153
  Kelly, 622 F.3d at 259 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). 
154
  Id. at 261. 
155
  Id. at 262 (“We find these cases insufficiently analogous to the facts of this case to have put 
Officer Rogers on notice of a clearly established right to videotape police officers during a traffic 
stop.”). To emphasize the uniqueness of the facts, the court emphasized that “none of the precedents 
upon which Kelly relies involved traffic stops.” Id. at 262. This statement adds little to the analysis and 
is also factually incorrect. In Smith v. City of Cumming, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly held that citizens 
have a First Amendment right to record the police. 212 F.3d at 1332–33. Although not mentioned in the 
text of the opinion, a cursory examination of the briefs indicates the issue actually did arise in the 
context of traffic stops. Brief of Appellant at 2, 11–12, Smith, 212 F.3d at 1332 (No. 99-8199-J); see 
also infra Part II.C.1 (discussing Smith in greater detail). In an effort to diminish Smith’s persuasive 
value, the Kelly court noted that, “[i]n the decade since [Smith] was decided, our decision in Gilles is the 
only federal appeals court case to cite it.” Kelly, 622 F.3d at 260 (citing Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 
212 n.14 (3d Cir. 2005)). This assertion, while correct, more likely reflects the fact that no court, circuit 
court of appeals or otherwise, considered whether individuals have a First Amendment right to record 
the police from 2000 until 2005. On July 19, 2005, a district court in the Third Circuit unequivocally 
held that the right exists. Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 542 (E.D. Pa. 2005). Just three 
months later, in Gilles v. Davis, the Third Circuit stated that the right “may” exist. 427 F.3d at 212 n.14. 
Both cases cited Smith. Id.; Robinson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 541. The only other circuit courts to discuss 
citizens recording police conduct before Gilles did not analyze whether the right to do so exists under 
the First Amendment or whether that right was clearly established. See Johnson v. Hawe, 388 F.3d 676, 
679 (9th Cir. 2004) (determining whether recording a police officer in the conduct of his official duties 
violated Washington’s Privacy Act); cf. Walker v. City of Pine Bluff, 414 F.3d 989, 991–93 (8th Cir. 
2005) (analyzing a citizen’s right to observe the police performing their duties and considering whether 
an officer has “arguable probable cause to arrest [an individual] for obstructing governmental operations 
because [that individual] distracted officers who were conducting a traffic stop by silently watching the 
encounter from across the street with his arms folded in a disapproving manner.”). 
156
  In order of reference by the Kelly court, the cases are: (1) Gilles, 427 F.3d at 212 n.14; (2) Smith, 
212 F.3d at 1332–33; (3) Robinson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 541; (4) Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 
439 (9th Cir. 1995); (5) Blackston v. Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994); (6) Demarest v. 
Athol/Orange Community Television, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 82, 94 (D. Mass. 2002); (7) Thompson v. 
City of Clio, 765 F. Supp. 1066, 1070 (M.D. Ala. 1991); and (8) Lambert v. Polk County, 723 F. Supp. 
128, 133–35 (S.D. Iowa 1989). See 622 F.3d at 260–63. 
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with regard to police officers.157 This is twice as many cases as the Third 
Circuit needed to find a right clearly established in Kopec.158 In fact, the 
Kelly court did not identify a single case that denied the existence of the 
right to record the police or other public officials,159 even though denying 
citizens the right to record police conduct is the practical outcome of its 
ruling.160 Nor could the Kelly court draw on any additional post-Pearson161 
cases from the Third Circuit that analyzed the constitutional merits of the 
right because those cases uniformly held that the right was not “clearly 
established.”162 Therefore, Kelly, the third court in the Third Circuit to 
conclude that the right to record the police was not “clearly established,” 
appears to bear out Saucier’s unsettling prediction that “[t]he law might be 
deprived of [an] explanation were a court simply to skip ahead to the 
 
157
  See id. at 260–61. 
158
  The court in Kopec cites Third Circuit precedent to establish the principle that “[t]his court has 
adopted a broad view of what constitutes an established right of which a reasonable person would have 
known.” 361 F.3d 772, 778 (3d Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Burns v. Cnty. of Cambria, 
971 F.2d 1015, 1024 (3d Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Kopec court then used this 
principle to declare a right clearly established by using three factually distinct cases, all from courts 
outside the Third Circuit. Id. (citing Martin v. Heideman, 106 F.3d 1308, 1312 (6th Cir. 1997); 
Alexander v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 64 F.3d 1315, 1322–23 (9th Cir. 1995); Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 
1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1993)). In fact, Kopec only cites to the Third Circuit to justify its use of persuasive 
precedent from other circuits. Id. This makes it peculiar that Kelly fails to do the same with precedent 
that is more factually and geographically analogous. 
159
  The court cited Pomykacz v. West Wildwood as an example of a court that “declined to adopt 
[the] blanket assertion that ‘the observation and monitoring of public officials is protected by the [F]irst 
[A]mendment.’” Kelly, 622 F.3d at 261 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Pomykacz v. 
W. Wildwood, 438 F. Supp. 2d 504, 512–13 & n.14 (D.N.J. 2006)). However, stating that an alternative 
argument can be made without adopting one side or the other is not an affirmative denial of that 
argument. Moreover, the Kelly court ignored a case from a Pennsylvania district court that supports the 
conclusion that the public has a right to record the police in a public place. See McKenna v. City of 
Philadelphia, No. 07-CV-110, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76766, at *11, 32–34 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2008), 
aff’d, 582 F.3d 447 (3d Cir. 2009) (“At the plaintiffs’ request (and over the objection of the City), I gave 
[a jury] instruction in this case that videotaping [the police] in a public place was a protected activity, 
but I declined to extend that right to the secured area of the police district.”). It also failed to mention 
extra-district cases that reach the opposite conclusion of Pomykacz. See Am. Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Local 
Union No. 7, Int’l Ass’n of Bridge Workers, No. 04-12536, 2006 WL 300422, at *4 n.6 (D. Mass. 
2006), aff’d, 536 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Videotaping of public activity for the purposes of petitioning 
governmental authorities would seem to be activity protected by the First Amendment.”). 
160
  See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) (arguing that the absence of constitutional 
decisions will likely cause officials to “persist[] in [the] challenged practice” because the official “knows 
that he can avoid liability” in the future by means of granted qualified immunity because the law “still” 
remains not clearly established). 
161
  In Robinson v. Fetterman, the district court concluded that the right to record the police exists, 
378 F. Supp. 2d at 534, but the case was decided before Pearson gave courts discretion to choose the 
order in which they engage in qualified immunity analysis, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). 
162
  Banks v. Gallagher, No. 3:08-1110, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55308, at *35–36 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 
18, 2010); Matheny v. Cnty. of Allegheny, No. 09-1070, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24189, at *12 (W.D. 
Pa. Mar. 16, 2010). 
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question whether the law clearly established that the officer’s conduct was 
unlawful in the circumstances of the case.”163 
The Kelly court should have also considered the above precedent164 in 
light of the specific context of Brian Kelly’s case. The Supreme Court has 
stated that the “specific context” of a case’s facts is relevant in determining 
whether a right was clearly established at the time the government official 
acted,165 and that the police officers “can still be on notice that their conduct 
violates established law even in novel factual circumstances” as long as the 
defendant had “‘fair warning’ that his conduct was unconstitutional.”166 In 
Kelly, Officer Rogers almost certainly had “fair warning” of these court 
decisions at the time of Kelly’s arrest. This is because the Borough of 
Carlisle’s police department has a “very vigorous training program”167 that, 
in 2007, included a required “Legal Updates”168 course that covered “legal 
issues affecting municipal police officers,” such as “United States Supreme 
Court opinions and Pennsylvania court decisions regarding Search and 
Seizure as well as other pertinent case law.”169 Decisions establishing the 
right to record police conduct had been on the books in Pennsylvania for 
two years prior to the incident in Kelly.170 Moreover, the Manheim 
Township Police Department in nearby Lancaster, Pennsylvania had an 
official policy of “recogniz[ing] the legal standing of members of the public 
to make video/audio recordings of police officers” since December 2007 at 
the latest.171 Although published after Kelly’s arrest, it is unreasonable to 
 
163
  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 
164
  See supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text. 
165
  Id. (stating that the inquiry into whether a right was clearly established for the purposes of a 
qualified immunity defense “must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a 
broad general proposition” (emphasis added)). 
166
  Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 259–60 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 
U.S. 730, 741 (2002)). 
167




  Id. at 9–10. The Municipal Police Officers’ Education and Training Program was created by 
statute and provides for a commission that can “establish and administer the minimum courses of study 
for basic and in-service training for police officers and to revoke an officer’s certification when an 
officer fails to comply with the basic and in-service training requirements,” 53 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 2164(1) (2010), and “require[s] every police officer to attend a minimum number of hours of in-
service training,” id. § 2164(6). 
169
  2007 MIST Topics, COMMONWEALTH OF PA. MUN. POLICE OFFICERS’ EDUC. & TRAINING 
COMM’N, http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/mpoetc/7545/training/595035 (last 
visited Mar. 18, 2012). Although this source was easily retrieved through a Google search, Brian Kelly’s 
attorneys failed to cite to these documents as strong evidence that Officer Rogers actually knew of these 
cases. See Brief of Appellant at 25–32, Kelly, 622 F.3d at 248 (No. 09-2644), 2009 WL 6358608 at *25–
31. 
170
  See, e.g., Robinson v. Fetterman, 378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 542 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
171
  MANHEIM TOWNSHIP POLICE DEP’T, POLICY MANUAL 1 (2007), available at http://www.
aele.org/law/2009all05/manheim.pdf. 
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assume that a township within an hour of the Borough of Carlisle would 
possess exclusive knowledge of such a right. 
Given the facts of the case, the relevant caselaw, and the Kelly court’s 
failure to definitively establish that Officer Rogers lacked actual knowledge 
of the right, the Third Circuit should have concluded that the right to record 
the police was clearly established and conducted a merits analysis of 
Kelly’s constitutional claims. Doing so would have brought the Third 
Circuit’s opinion in line with the First Circuit’s more recent holding in Glik 
v. Cunniffe,172 at least in terms of analytical procedure. The next sections 
further support this conclusion with a more detailed examination of 
evidence from outside the Third Circuit,173 background information on the 
historical and traditional practice of the public monitoring of police 
conduct, and a review of contemporary legal scholarship. 
C. The Right to Record Police Is “Clearly Established” 
Although the “clearly established” standard is generally considered 
within the “specific context of the case” and not as a “broad general 
proposition,”174 numerous sources—in addition to First Circuit’s decision in 
Glik v. Cunniffe—support the idea that the right to record the police is 
clearly established at the national level.175 A “right” is “[s]omething that is 
due to a person by just claim, legal guarantee, or moral principle.”176 As 
such, intracircuit caselaw (an example of a right established by “legal 
guarantee”) is only one piece of the puzzle, and therefore additional sources 
should be considered persuasive when determining whether a right is 
clearly established. Subsection C.1 examines established caselaw in circuit 
courts of appeal, subsection C.2 outlines the historical and traditional 
practice of the public monitoring police conduct, and subsection C.3 briefly 
presents contemporary legal scholarship. These sources are useful not only 
because a circuit’s own precedent may not necessarily capture the 
overriding “moral principle” of the right, but also because these numerous 
sources necessarily interact to “establish” rights and communicate them to 
the general public. 
1. Smith v. City of Cumming.—The right to record police conduct 
was first promulgated by the Eleventh Circuit in its 2000 opinion Smith v. 
City of Cumming.177 In Smith, plaintiffs James and Barbara Smith filed a suit 
 
172
  655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011); see also supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the First Circuit’s opinion). 
173
  See, e.g., Bergeron v. Cabral, 560 F.3d 1, 11 (2009) (“The court should search the relevant 
authorities both in circuit and out of circuit.”). 
174
  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 
175
  The Fourteenth Amendment renders the First Amendment applicable to the states. E.g., Edwards 
v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (citing Supreme Court cases). 
176
  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1436 (9th ed. 2009). 
177
  212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). 
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alleging harassment against the City of Cumming Police Department 
(CCPD) under § 1983.178 Although not binding outside the Eleventh 
Circuit,179 the facts of the case make the ruling particularly persuasive. 
In response to what the couple thought to be an improper traffic stop 
conducted on Mrs. Smith, Mr. Smith used a police scanner180 and a video 
camera to randomly track and videotape police officers making traffic stops 
to try to obtain evidence of the police improperly stopping other vehicles.181 
Mr. Smith never interfered with the police activity and always recorded 
their conduct from public property.182 Nevertheless, the CCPD obtained an 
arrest warrant for Mr. Smith for “videotaping of . . . police officers.”183 
After continued harassment,184 the Smiths filed suit under § 1983 for 
damages.185 The district court dismissed the Smiths’s claim and they 
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.186 The court held that the Smiths “had a 
First Amendment right, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions, to photograph or videotape police conduct,” adding that the 
“First Amendment protects the right to gather information about what 
public officials do on public property, and specifically, a right to record 
matters of public interest.”187 
When applied to the facts, this holding means that Mr. Smith was 
within his First Amendment rights to use a police scanner and video camera 
to follow and record police officers making traffic stops.188 That Mr. Smith 
 
178
  Brief of Appellant, supra note 155, at 3–10. 
179
  See POSNER, supra note 146, at 380 (“[T]he thirteen courts of appeals constitute at best a loose 
confederacy, brought under some semblance of unity only by their common subjection to the ultimate 
authority of the Supreme Court.”). 
180
  In Florida, use of police scanners is legal as long as it is not done in furtherance of a crime. FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 843.167(1)(a) (West Supp. 2012) (“A person may not [i]ntercept any police radio 
communication by use of a scanner or any other means for the purpose of using that communication to 
assist in committing a crime or to escape from or avoid detection, arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment 
in connection with the commission of such crime.”). 
181
  Brief of Appellant, supra note 155, at 11. 
182
  Id. 
183
  Id. 
184
  CCPD officers obtained an arrest warrant against Mr. Smith for videotaping the police and 
allegedly “intimidate[d]” and “embarrass[ed]” the Smiths with it at their place of business. Id. 
185
  Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1332 (11th Cir. 2000). 
186
  Id. 
187
  Id. at 1333. However, the court also found that the Smiths failed to demonstrate that the CCPD 
violated this right. Id. (“Although the Smiths have a right to videotape police activities, they have not 
shown that the Defendants’ actions violated that right.”).  
188
  See Brief of Appellant, supra note 155, at 11 (“If the [the police] performed a stop, [Mr. Smith] 
would videotape the traffic stop.” (emphasis added)). Of course, this fact completely undermines the 
Third Circuit’s claim that its “decision [in Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle] on the First Amendment 
question is further supported by the fact that none of the precedents [including Smith v. City of 
Cumming] . . . involve[] traffic stops,” Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2010), 
rendering its holding even less persuasive. See discussion supra note 155. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 298 
actively followed the police to record their conduct strengthens the 
argument that this right exists and is clearly established because his actions 
are much more invasive than what many others are currently trying to do. 
Rather than follow the police looking for improper conduct, most police 
recorders are more likely to observe the police interacting with members of 
the public by happenstance, take out their cell phones, and press “record.”189 
Therefore, Smith supports the First Amendment rights of individuals to take 
spontaneous recordings, as well as those of third-party watchdog groups 
who are as active as Mr. Smith in tracking and monitoring police conduct.190 
Although Smith speaks to more modern means of making audio and video 
recordings to report police conduct, the act of observing the police and 
publicly disseminating complaints is a practice that dates back hundreds of 
years. 
2. Historical Public Monitoring of the Police.—The police enjoy a 
unique grant of state power: “they are the only representatives of 
governmental authority who are legally permitted to use force against the 
citizen.”191 As such, their actions must be subject to public observation and 
reporting in a democratic society. The purpose of police in the American 
democratic experiment192 has always been to protect the “common good.”193 
America’s earliest police force, the “citizen Watchmen” of Boston,194 was 
established in 1636 because of a general sentiment that communities should 
have watchers.195 Modern policing is a function of these colonial 
 
189
  See, e.g., Hillary Federico, Quinnipiac Students Claim Police Brutality, 1 Arrested After Taping 
Cops, MIDDLETOWN PRESS (Sept. 29, 2010, 12:41 PM), http://www.middletownpress.com/articles/
2010/09/29/news/doc4ca29f3b65426189342936.txt; Alan Zarembo, Confrontation Between Sheriff’s 
Deputies, Bus Rider Caught on Tape, L.A. TIMES BLOG (Jan. 11, 2012, 10:37 AM), http://latimesblogs.
latimes.com/lanow/2012/01/confrontation-between-deputies-bus-rider-caught-on-tape.html. 
190
  Paul Crawley, Overzealous Cops Cost Atlanta $40,000 for Seizing Video, 11ALIVE ATLANTA 
WXIA TV (Feb. 11, 2011, 8:24 PM), http://www.11alive.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=177508 
(“‘If you stand back away from the officers and you’re in a public place, you have an absolute right 
under 11th Circuit [Court of Appeals] law to photograph or video [tape] those officers,’ said Dan 
Grossman . . . .” (alterations in original)). Attorney Dan Grossman represented a member of a watchdog 
group who was allegedly assaulted by the police for recording their conduct. Id. 
191
  ZENITH GROSS & ALAN REITMAN, ACLU, POLICE POWER AND CITIZENS’ RIGHTS: THE CASE 
FOR AN INDEPENDENT POLICE REVIEW BOARD 4 (1966). 
192
  See Wilbur R. Miller, Police Authority in London and @ew York City 1830–1870, J. SOC. HIST., 
Winter 1975, at 81, 83 (arguing that American “representative democracy” caused police in mid-
nineteenth century New York City to view their authority in a much different way than their 
contemporaries in London). 
193
  See SAVAGE, supra note †, at 13. 
194
  Id. 
195
  See RAYMOND B. FOSDICK, AMERICAN POLICE SYSTEMS 59 (1920) (“As early as 1636 a night 
watch was established in Boston, and thereafter hardly an important settlement existed in New England 
that did not have, in addition to its military guard, a few ununiformed watchmen.” (footnote omitted)). 
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community ideals,196 making the police “representatives or agents of 
society” and rendering their actions a proxy for citizen actions.197 Moreover, 
police officers are themselves members of the community,198 making them 
aware of their responsibility to the public as its representatives199 and the 
public’s corresponding democratic right to monitor their actions.200 
The democratic right to monitor and report on police conduct has been 
documented for more than a century. For example, in response to an assault 
and battery conviction against a police officer, the Chicago Tribune 
published an editorial in 1857 arguing that police officers who exceed their 
authority should “suffer the consequences” of the punishment they 
“deserve,” lamenting that violating officers often escape punishment 
because “those whom they oppress are too poor or too ignorant to enforce 
their rights.”201 In 1892, the @ew York Times ran an even clearer and more 
direct report of police misconduct: a sixty-one-year-old man that was 
allegedly beaten and critically injured by police after being arrested for 
refusing to pay his streetcar fare.202 The Chicago Tribune reported a 
factually similar altercation in 1893 between a policeman and a “negro 
porter,” where the porter alleged that the officer “peremptorily ordered” 
him into a basement and “appended to his order a kick and a stroke from his 
billy, which left an ugly scar on the negro’s forehead.”203 About two weeks 
later, the Chicago Tribune published an editorial that chastised a police 
officer for physically striking and arresting a citizen when he threatened to 
report the officer for failing to clear a crowded street.204 The author then 
approvingly described the offending officer’s dismissal from the police 
 
196
  MARY JEANETTE HAGEMAN, POLICE–COMMUNITY RELATIONS 14–16 (James A. Inciardi ed., 
1985). 
197
  See Deborah Johnson, Morality and Police Harm, in ETHICS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 79, 86 (Frederick Elliston & Norman Bowie eds., 1982); see also DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, 
DEMOCRACY AND THE POLICE 86 (2008) (“[C]ommunities exist, . . . have coherent views and interests, 
and . . . law enforcement, and the criminal justice system more generally, can and should reflect those 
interests.”); VICTOR G. STRECHER, THE ENVIRONMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 15 (1971) (“The 
conclusion is inescapable that in this country, perhaps for the first time recorded in history, policemen 
are proxies for other citizens.”). 
198
  W. H. Parker, The Police Role in Community Relations, 47 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POL. 
SCI. 368, 371 (1956) (“A police department is . . . merely a group of citizens employed to exercise 
certain functions. It is created by the public, shaped by the public, and operated by the public.”). 
199
  See HAGEMAN, supra note 196, at 22. 
200
  E.g., G. Richards, Effective Police-Community Relations Are the Cornerstone of the Prevention 
and Detection of Crime, 65 POLICE J. 10, 13 (1992) (“The police . . . recognize the citizen’s democratic 
right to monitor and criticize police actions which affect public welfare.”).  
201
  Editorial, Policemen and Their Duties, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 3, 1857, at 1. 
202
  See Says Policemen Beat Him, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1892, at 5. 
203
  Says a Policeman Assaulted Him, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Mar. 18, 1893, at 1. 
204
  See Editorial, Remonstrating with Policemen, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 6, 1893, at 4. 
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force following an unsuccessful defense of his actions in “police court.”205 
The pages of nineteenth-century newspapers swelled with reports of police 
officers being arrested,206 charged,207 and subsequently convicted208 or 
acquitted209 of misconduct and brutality. 
Over time, the complaint process has become more formalized with the 
creation of police oversight committees staffed by civilians and funded by 
state and local governments.210 These boards exist all over the United States 
and have been around in some form for more than sixty years.211 Generally, 
these oversight boards investigate and recommend punishment for police 
misconduct.212 Of course, concrete evidence of misconduct in the form of a 
video on a cell phone would make these bodies more effective because they 
would generally have stronger evidence to help determine which claims 
have merit and which do not.213 
 
205
  Id.; see also Fighting the Police Is Timewell’s Life Work, BOS. GLOBE, Apr. 4, 1909, at SM5 
(praising a tailor in London, England, who made reporting, challenging, and “[f]ighting” police abuse 
his “life[’s] work”). 
206
  E.g., Arrest of a Lieutenant of Police on a Charge of Assault and Battery, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, 
Nov. 14, 1856, at 6 (reporting that the Lieutenant of the Thirteenth Ward Police was “in trouble again” 
for “assault[ing a] deponent”); Arrest of Police Officers Charged with Burglary, N.Y. DAILY, Jan. 13, 
1853, at 8 (describing police officers who were arrested for an alleged burglary at a “wholesale grocery 
store”). 
207
  E.g., A Strange Case, ATLANTA CONST., Oct. 22, 1884, at 3D (reporting that three police 
officers were charged with a “very serious assault”); Patrolman Hogan on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 
1889, at 8 (reporting charges that “[p]atrolman Peter Hogan . . . assaulted . . . a baker, . . . striking him 
with a heavy cane and fracturing his skull”); Proceedings of the Courts, SUN (Balt.), Sept. 2, 1861, at 1 
(reporting that a police officer was charged with assault); Several Police Officers Dismissed and Others 
Reprimanded, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 22, 1870, at 3 (“Patrolman Thomas Flynn . . . was charged ‘with 
neglecting to treat persons civilly and respectfully on all occasions, and intoxication.’ He was discharged 
from the force.”); The Rights of Colored Persons, THE LIBERATOR (Bos.), May 13, 1853, at 75 
(reporting that a police officer was charged for pushing a woman down stairs); Two Police Officers 
Charged with Brutality to Citizens, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Aug. 26, 1882, at 12 (reporting that police 
officers were charged with “brutally assault[ing]” a woman “during a fracas over the building of a 
fence” and “str[iking] in the face” a witness who “protested against such brutality”). 
208
  E.g., A @ew M.P. Convicted of Assault and Battery, N.Y. DAILY TIMES, July 20, 1857, at 3. 
209
  In 1858, The Sun reported that a police officer was tried for assault when he allegedly “seized [a 
woman] by the throat” and then “choked her and pushed her violently against a door.” Proceedings of 
the Courts, SUN (Balt.), Mar. 2, 1858, at 1. The next day, the same paper reported that the jury “rendered 
a verdict of ‘not guilty.’” Proceedings of the Courts, SUN (Balt.), Mar. 3, 1858, at 1. 
210
  See, e.g., Cheryl Beattie & Ronald Weitzer, Race, Democracy and Law: Civilian Review of 
Police in Washington, DC, in CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF POLICING 41, 51–52 (Andrew Goldsmith & 
Colleen Lewis eds., 2000) (discussing the establishment of Washington, D.C.’s publicly funded 
“Civilian Complaint Review Board” to adjudicate “all non-frivolous complaints” against the police). 
211
  See James R. Hudson, Police Review Boards and Police Accountability, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 515, 520, 523, 526 (1971) (explaining that the “Civilian Complaint Review Board” was 
established in New York City in 1953 and that the “Philadelphia Police Review Board” was established 
in 1958). 
212
  Id. at 520. 
213
  See Deborah Jian Lee, @YPD Calls On Citizens for Amateur Video Evidence, REUTERS (July 31, 
2008, 6:02 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/07/31/us-newyork-crime-video-
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It is becoming easier than ever for citizens to monitor the police given 
the ubiquity of cell phones able to record, edit, and instantly publish videos 
to the Internet.214 Using a cell phone to record and disseminate police 
conduct is functionally identical to the traditional democratic right to 
observe and report police conduct. The only difference is that a camera is 
used instead of eyewitness testimony and hearsay—a change that actually 
benefits the accuracy of reporting misconduct.215 
3. First Amendment Doctrine.—This section summarizes the work of 
four authors who have addressed the First Amendment right to record 
police conduct, covering a number of ways in which the First Amendment 
protects the right of individuals to record police. They have not, however, 
discussed the doctrine of prior restraint. Professor Seth Kreimer argues that 
videotaping the police conveys a message and is inherently expressive, and 
that these “captured images” therefore constitute speech protected by the 
First Amendment,216 even if they are not outwardly shared with another 
person.217 He also argues that the right to record the police is protected by 
the right to gather information under the First Amendment.218 
Professor Howard Wasserman argues that the First Amendment’s Free 
Press and Petition Clauses also protect the right to record police conduct.219 
For the former, he suggests that modern technology has created a low-cost 
means to capture and disseminate video, making virtually anyone a member 
of the press because they can share information as easily as media outlets.220 
For the latter, he writes that recording the police facilitates petitioning the 
 
idUSN3136650420080731 (“Soon citizen sleuths can transmit evidence of criminal activity directly to 
the police and 911, including evidence of police misconduct . . . .”). 
214
  See Cohen, supra note 13. 
215
  See Parker, supra note 198, at 375 (complaining that negative newspaper articles about police 
misconduct “were written solely from the unsubstantiated account given by the arrestee”); see also Gary 
L. Wells et al., Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 440, 440 (1979) (“[S]taged-crime research indicates that eyewitness identifications are often 
unreliable.”). 
216
  Kreimer, supra note 26, at 372–74. This was published in 2011, after the Third Circuit decided 
Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle, 622 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2010). See discussion supra Part II.B.2. Professor 
Kreimer also argues that recording the police is speech, not conduct, because image capture with 
modern technology facilitates the subsequent transfer and dissemination of the footage. Kreimer, supra 
note 26, at 375–76. 
217
  Kreimer, supra note 26, at 377–78. 
218
  Id. at 387, 390–91. Professor Kreimer notes, however, that the right to gather information has 
been rejected by the Supreme Court as an “an unadorned First Amendment [right] that supersedes other 
legal obligations.” Id. at 387. 
219
  Wasserman, supra note 77, at 656–58. Professor Wasserman’s article was published and 
available before the Third Circuit decided Kelly. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
220
  See id. at 657; see also About C@@ iReport, CNN IREPORT, http://ireport.cnn.com/about.jspa 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2012) (inviting the average citizen to partake in news reporting). 
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government to redress grievances because video footage provides a reliable, 
“unambiguous,” and “conclusive” source of information.221 
Finally, two student pieces discuss the right to record police conduct 
under the First Amendment: Lisa Skehill argues that it falls within the right 
to gather information;222 Jesse Alderman argues that the public has the right 
to receive information about police conduct.223 Prior restraint is the only 
area of First Amendment doctrine that has not been applied to recording 
police conduct. 
III. PRIOR RESTRAINT 
The doctrine of prior restraint refers to the suppression of speech 
before it reaches the public. Prior restraints traditionally took the form of 
requirements that individuals submit their speech to a government official 
for approval before sharing it with the public.224 The prohibition against 
prior restraint has its roots in seventeenth-century England. Before 1688, 
nothing could be published without approval from the Office of the 
Imprimateur.225 When that office was abolished, censorship disappeared and 
the press was “said to be free.”226 This idea of a free press was imported to 
the United States and immortalized in the Free Press Clause of the First 
Amendment to the Constitution.227 
This Part applies the doctrine of prior restraint to recording and sharing 
depictions of police conduct. First, it outlines the rule established in @ear v. 
Minnesota228 that prior restraints on speech are presumptively invalid and 
applies that rule to citizens recording the police; it continues by discussing 
the exceptions to this rule articulated in @ear and shows that recording the 
police falls outside them. Second, it presents the post-@ear expansion of 
what actions the Court considers prior restraint, showing them to 
 
221
  Wasserman, supra note 77, at 658–59. 
222
  Skehill, supra note 5, at 1000–02. But see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (“The right to 
speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.”); Kreimer, supra 
note 26, at 387 (quoting Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17). 
223
  Alderman, supra note 74, at 521–25. 
224
  Emerson, supra note 42, at 648; see also id. at 650 (“As early as 1501, Pope Alexander VI, in a 
bull which prohibited unlicensed printing, applied the technique of prior restraint as a means of control. 
In England . . . printing first developed under royal sponsorship and soon became a monopoly to be 
granted by the Crown. . . . The Licensing Act of 1662 illustrates the scope of the system. Not only were 
seditious and heretical books and pamphlets prohibited, but no person was allowed to print any material 
unless it was first [approved by agencies of the Crown].”); 2 THOMAS PAINE, Liberty of the Press, in 
THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 463, 464 (George H. Evans ed., G.H. Evans 1839) (1824) 
(describing early systems of prior restraint in England and France).  
225
  PAINE, supra note 224, at 434. 
226
  Id. (explaining that, “inconsequence of [the] abolition,” work could “be published without first 
obtaining the permission of the government officer”). 
227
  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
228
  283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
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encompass restrictions on citizens recording the police. Finally, it 
demonstrates that, contrary to the beliefs of some, “subsequent punishment” 
is a form of prior restraint, and argues that situations like Anthony Graber’s 
fit within the subsequent-punishment-as-prior-restraint framework. 
A. Near v. Minnesota 
The landmark Supreme Court case that wrestled with the issue of prior 
restraint was @ear v. Minnesota.229 There, the Court considered a Minnesota 
statute declaring a nuisance any publication that state officials––including 
the police––considered “obscene, lewd and lascivious” or “malicious, 
scandalous and defamatory.”230  The statute granted courts the authority to 
permanently prevent such speech and punish the speaker with a fine, 
imprisonment, or both.231 
The issue in @ear arose when a county attorney successfully brought 
an action to enjoin publication of The Saturday Press for printing articles 
that alleged, among other things, that “law enforcing officers” were not 
“energetically performing their duties.”232 Of particular relevance to the 
topic of this Comment is that “[m]ost of the [publication’s] charges were 
directed against the Chief of Police; he was charged with gross neglect of 
duty, illicit relations with gangsters, and with participation in graft.”233 
Writing for a 5–4 majority,234 Chief Justice Hughes protected the 
publication’s right to criticize police officers by invalidating the statute as 
an unconstitutional “previous restraint[]” on speech, comfortably couching 
his reasoning in the First Amendment’s Free Press Clause.235 Chief Justice 
Hughes noted that this right was “especially cherished for the immunity it 
afforded from previous restraint of the publication of censure of public 
officers and charges of official misconduct.”236 
The right to record the police and the way it is being prevented in 
states with all-party consent wiretapping statutes is eerily analogous to 
@ear. Where the police in @ear found that a publication criticizing police 
officers violated a statute that prohibited “scandalous” speech, so too are the 
police in all-party consent states finding that citizens who record their 
conduct violate state wiretapping statutes. In so doing, the police are using 
state wiretapping statutes to prevent communication of a message that may 
 
229
  Id. 
230
  MINN. STAT. § 10123-1 to -2 (Mason’s 1927) (superseded by @ear, 283 U.S. at 697). 
231
  See id. § 10123-3. 
232
  @ear, 283 U.S. at 703–04. 
233
  Id. at 704. 
234
  Id. at 701, 738. 
235
  Id. at 716 (“The exceptional nature of its limitations places in a strong light the general 
conception that liberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by the Federal Constitution, has 
meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship.”). 
236
  Id. at 717. 
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be (but is not necessarily) critical of them. And, just as the Minnesota 
authorities attempted to punish the publishers in order to prevent speech, 
police are attempting the same prior restraint today by threatening recorders 
at the scene,237 confiscating their cameras,238 arresting them,239 or, as with 
Anthony Graber, punishing them after the video has been disseminated.240 
Because these efforts are geared towards preventing the public from 
receiving messages critical of the police,241 this is essentially the same form 
of prior restraint Chief Justice Hughes ruled unconstitutional in @ear, albeit 
with slightly sleeker technology. 
B. Exceptions to the Presumptive Invalidity of Prior Restraint 
The Court’s decision in @ear v. Minnesota242 effectively created a 
presumption that prior restraints on speech are unconstitutional.243 However, 
Chief Justice Hughes also suggested that the government may successfully 
rebut this presumption and suppress speech in the “exceptional cases” 
when: (1) it would “obstruct[] . . . [military] recruiting . . . or [disclose] 
sailing dates of transports or the number and location of troops,” (2) “the 
primary requirements of decency [need to] be enforced against obscene 
publications,” or (3) “[t]he security of the community life [needs to] be 
protected against incitements to acts of violence and the overthrow by force 
of orderly government.”244 Even if one of these three standards is met, a 
restraint is only properly imposed when the “evil that would result . . . is 
both great and certain and cannot be mitigated by less intrusive 
measures.”245 
The only @ear exception that recording police conduct could 
conceivably fall under is the third, a standard the Court elaborated on in 
@ew York Times Co. v. United States (The Pentagon Papers Case).246 There, 
the federal government sought a temporary restraining order and 
 
237
  E.g., Ickes v. Borough of Bedford, 271 F.R.D. 458, 459 (W.D. Pa. 2010); Connell v. Town of 
Hudson, 733 F. Supp. 465, 466–67 (D.N.H. 1990). 
238
  E.g., Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F. Supp. 634, 636–37 (D. Minn. 1972). 
239
  E.g., Adkins v. Guam Police Dep’t, No. 09-00029, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87353, at *6–7 (D. 
Guam Aug. 24, 2010). 
240
  E.g., State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *1, *5 (Md. Cir. Ct. Sept. 
27, 2010). If this subsequent punishment is frequent and public, then it will strongly discourage this 
speech in the future. See infra Part III.D. 
241
  See RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL 
SECURITY 107 (2006) (arguing the government should not be able to classify information, and thereby 
prevent the public from obtaining it, just because it would “embarrass the agency by revealing its 
mistakes”). 
242
  283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
243
  JEROME A. BARRON & C. THOMAS DIENES, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 57 (4th ed. 2008). 
244
  @ear, 283 U.S. at 716. 
245
  CBS Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1317 (1994). 
246
  403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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preliminary injunction against the @ew York Times to prevent it from 
publishing classified documents about the Vietnam War.247 The Court 
permitted publication of the documents and held that the court-ordered 
injunction preventing publication was an unconstitutional prior restraint.248 
The guiding standard emerged from the concurrences of Justices Stewart 
and Brennan249: the government must show that allowing publication will 
“surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or 
its people.”250 Thus, the @ear presumption against prior restraints is 
rebuttable in the face of “extreme danger to national security.”251 
Recording police conduct does not pose a direct, immediate, 
irreparable threat to any community or its people. Although footage of 
police misconduct might cause some initial tumult,252 this is not irreparable 
and does not necessarily pose immediate danger to national security. In fact, 
the Transportation Security Administration does not even prohibit filming 
at airport security checkpoints,253 and if anything could rise to the level of 
threatening national security such that recording law enforcement officials 
is justifiably prohibited under a @ear exception, surely it would be a 
 
247
  Id. at 714. 
248
  Id. 
249
  See Thomas R. Litwak, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 519, 544–
45 (1977). Compare The Pentagon Papers Case, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) (concluding 
that an attempted restriction on newspaper publication requires a showing that the underlying content 
will “surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people”), with id. at 
726–27 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[O]nly governmental allegation and proof that publication must 
inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the concurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety 
of a transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an interim restraining order. . . . Unless and 
until the Government has clearly made out its case, the First Amendment commands that no injunction 
may issue.”). 
250
  The Pentagon Papers Case, 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
251
  BARRON & DIENES, supra note 243, at 63 (emphasis added); see also CBS Inc. v. Davis, 510 
U.S. 1315, 1317 (1994) (“Even where questions of allegedly urgent national security . . . are concerned, 
we have imposed this ‘most extraordinary remed[y]’ only where the evil that would result from the 
reportage is both great and certain and cannot be mitigated by less intrusive measures” (alteration in 
original) (quoting Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976))); Bantam Books, Inc. v. 
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (“Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court 
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”). 
252
  For example, this was the case in the wake of the Rodney King video and trial in 1991 and 1992. 
Associated Press, Bush Directs Federal Forces to Riot Area, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), May 2, 
1992, at 6A. 
253
  Can I Take Photos at the Checkpoint and Airport?, TSA BLOG (Mar. 31, 2009), http://blog.
tsa.gov/2009/03/can-i-take-photos-at-checkpoint-and.html (“[The Transportation Security 
Administration of the United States Department of Homeland Security doesn’t] prohibit public, 
passengers or press from photographing, videotaping, or filming at [airport] screening locations. You 
can take pictures at our checkpoints as long as you’re not interfering with the screening process or 
slowing things down. We also ask that you do not film or take pictures of our monitors.”). 
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potential threat to airport security.254 Finally, exposing police misconduct is 
equally likely to produce increased oversight over police, leading to reform 
and eventually more stability, not less.255 
C. Post-Near Expansion of What Constitutes Prior Restraint 
Although prior restraint doctrine has changed little in the wake of 
@ear, the Court’s conception of what constitutes an unconstitutional prior 
restraint on speech has broadened over the years. Prior restraint in the 
United States has historically been thought of in terms of a judicial 
injunction or a statutory licensing requirement,256 but it has expanded to 
include other forms of governmental speech suppression, such as taxes on 
newspaper publication processes257 or city ordinances allowing a mayor to 
approve permits for newspaper vending machines placed on public 
property.258 
The prohibition on prior restraints as originally expressed in @ear 
applies to any government actor, including a police officer.259 The Supreme 
Court made this application explicit eight years after @ear in Schneider v. 
State.260 In Schneider, the Court struck down four city ordinances as 
unconstitutional prior restraints on speech.261 These city ordinances required 
a government official, usually a police officer or the city’s police chief, to 
approve a citizen’s flyers or handbills before the citizen could distribute 
them.262 The Court held that, “a municipality cannot . . . require all who 
wish to disseminate ideas to present them first to police authorities for their 
 
254
  See Sally B. Donnelly, Behind the Airport Shutdowns, TIME, Mar. 18, 2002, at 26 (stating that 
security fears and “suspicious” items like a food processor or a pair of scissors found in a trash can 
cause an airport to be completely shutdown). 
255
  See Goldsmith, supra note 33, at 922–23 (stating that footage of police misconduct at the 2009 
G20 conference in London, England, “led to various investigations relating not just to this incident, but 
also to the policing of the G20 protests more generally” and “triggered and shaped the involvement of 
the oversight agency in a significant way”). 
256
  BARRON & DIENES, supra note 243, at 56–57. 
257
  See Minn. Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 586 n.9, 592–93 
(1983); Marin Scordato, Distinction Without a Difference: A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of Prior 
Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REV. 7 (1989). 
258
  See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757, 772 (1988). 
259
  See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931) (“[T]he operation and effect of the statute in 
substance is that public authorities may bring the owner or publisher of a newspaper or periodical before 
a judge upon a charge of conducting a business of publishing scandalous and defamatory matter—in 
particular that the matter consists of charges against public officers of official dereliction—and unless 
the owner or publisher is able and disposed to bring competent evidence to satisfy the judge that the 
charges are true and are published with good motives and for justifiable ends, his newspaper or 
periodical is suppressed and further publication is made punishable as a contempt.” (emphasis added)). 
260
  308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
261
  Id. at 165. 
262
  Id. at 163–64. 
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consideration and approval, with a discretion in the police to say some ideas 
may, while others may not, be carried to the homes of citizens.”263 
The Court again invoked prior restraint to declare the same type of 
police preapproval of speech unconstitutional in Cox v. Louisiana.264 In 
Cox, the appellant led a group of protestors in an antisegregation speech 
outside the State Capitol building, the local courthouse, and various 
businesses in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.265 Although the content of the speech 
and the demeanor of the crowd were peaceful,266 the Sheriff deemed the 
gathering “inflammatory” and instructed the demonstrators to disperse.267 In 
doing so, he invoked his power under Louisiana state law to arrest and 
charge individuals who were disobeying his command with disturbing the 
peace.268 The Court invalidated as unconstitutional the appellant’s 
conviction under the Louisiana statute.269 Although the Court did not use the 
words “prior restraint,” its explanation of the discretionary application of a 
broad state statute that gives law enforcement officials the power to choose 
which speech may occur embodies the same definition.270 
Schneider and Cox are readily applied to police officers and 
prosecutors who use all-party consent wiretapping laws to justify arresting 
and prosecuting citizens who record police conduct. The wiretapping 
statutes, though not necessarily overbroad, are being given extensive 
interpretation by police and prosecutors.271 This interpretation gives them 
 
263
  Id. at 164. 
264
  379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
265
  Id. at 539–42. 
266
  Id. at 542. 
267
  Id. at 543. 
268
  Id. at 544. 
269
  Id. at 558. 
270
  Compare id. at 557 (giving “broad discretion [to] a public official allows him to determine 
which expressions of view will be permitted and which will not[, and] . . . thus sanctions a device for the 
suppression of the communication of ideas and permits the official to act as a censor”), and id. at 557–58 
(“It is clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to determine which expressions of view will be 
permitted and which will not or to engage in invidious discrimination among persons or groups either by 
use of a statute providing a system of broad discretionary licensing power or, as in this case, the 
equivalent of such a system by selective enforcement of an extremely broad prohibitory statute.”), with 
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (“[L]iberty of the press, historically considered and taken 
up by the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not exclusively, immunity from previous 
restraints or censorship.”), and Emerson, supra note 42, at 648 (“The concept of prior restraint, roughly 
speaking, deals with official restriction imposed upon speech or other forms of expression in advance of 
actual publication.”). 
271
  See, e.g., Talk of the @ation: The Rules and Your Rights for Recording Arrests (NPR radio 
broadcast July 8, 2010), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128387108 
(“[T]he way that Maryland law enforcement officials have interpreted this law, when a police officer 
pulls you over, he has an expectation of privacy with respect to what transpires during the interaction.”). 
“Extensive interpretation” is “[a] liberal interpretation that applies a statutory provision to a case not 
falling within its literal words.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 894 (9th ed. 2009). 
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considerable discretion in restricting “expressions of view,”272 namely 
unfavorable views of the police. That discretion runs counter to the dictates 
of @ear, which clearly established the right to be free from censure for 
publicly criticizing public officials.273 Therefore, the discretionary 
enforcement of state wiretapping statutes against individuals recording 
police conduct is an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech. The First 
Amendment violation is further illuminated by the fact that the police—the 
very public officials who run the risk of being criticized—are tasked with 
determining whether to restrain an individual’s speech as a violation of a 
statute. 
Some courts have also ruled that physically preventing a person from 
capturing images is a form of prior restraint.274 In these instances, the 
“physical” prohibition was seizing the video equipment275 or arresting the 
videographer.276 Thus, one court stated that police seizing a news crew’s 
cameras and film as they filmed a burglary was “at least as effective a prior 
restraint—if not more so—as [the government’s actions] in @ew York Times 
v. United States.”277 And if seizing a videographer’s camera and film is a 
form of prior restraint, then detaining or arresting him surely is as well.278 In 
Robinson v. Fetterman, the plaintiff was arrested for filming the police 
making stops on the highway from private property onto which he had 
permission to enter.279 The police detained the plaintiff at the police station 
for several hours and confiscated his camera.280 In finding that the plaintiff 
“established his claim that the [police officers] retaliated against him for 
exercising his First Amendment right to videotape police conduct,”281 the 
court asserted that, “to the extent that the troopers were restraining [the 
plaintiff] from making any future videotapes and from publicizing or 
publishing what he had filmed, [their] conduct clearly amounted to an 
unlawful prior restraint upon his protected speech.”282 
 
272
  Cox, 379 U.S. at 557–58. 
273
  See @ear, 283 U.S. at 717. 
274
  See, e.g., Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F. Supp. 634, 636–37 (D. Minn. 1972). 
275
  See, e.g., Jones v. City of Minneapolis, No. 07-3577, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84330, at *4 (D. 
Minn. Sept. 15, 2009); Channel 10, 337 F. Supp. at 636. 
276
  See McCormick v. City of Lawrence, 271 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1303 (D. Kan. 2003). 
277
  Channel 10, 337 F. Supp. at 637 (citing The Pentagon Papers Case, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)). 
278
  See McCormick, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 1303 (“[A]n arrest may constitute a ‘prior restraint’ in some 
circumstances.”) 
279
  378 F. Supp. 2d 534, 539 (E.D. Pa. 2005). 
280
  Id. at 539–40. 
281
  Id. at 542. 
282
  Id. at 541 (emphasis added). Not all courts agree on this point. Compare McCormick, 271 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1303 (“[A]n arrest may constitute a ‘prior restraint’ in some circumstances.”), with 
McCormick v. City of Lawrence, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1191, 1202 (D. Kan. 2004) (“Although it appears that 
an arrest may constitute a ‘prior restraint’ in some circumstances, the law is not clearly established.”) 
(citations omitted). 
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D. Subsequent Punishment Is Prior Restraint 
Whereas prior restraint is a suppression of speech before it reaches the 
public, subsequent punishment threatens283 or issues punishment after the 
speech has been disseminated, indicating the government’s disapproval of 
the speech’s content and its desire to prevent similar speech in the future.284 
Although there is an argument that subsequent punishments are more 
justifiable than—and therefore somehow different from—prior restraint,285 
it is clear that repeatedly punishing the same speech will inevitably cause 
potential speakers to either censor their messages or refrain from sharing 
them entirely.286 Although the prior restraint and subsequent punishment 
encompass different actions, the government’s desired outcome is the same: 
to exclude what it deems are undesirable ideas from reaching the 
marketplace287 by continuously enforcing laws that punish certain speech. 
Therefore, subsequent punishment is a form of prior restraint.288 
The artificial dichotomy between “prior restraint” and “subsequent 
punishment” is problematic because it theoretically enables courts to permit 
prior restraints on speech if the punishment occurs after the speech takes 
place.289 The distinction first arose in American law in @ear v. Minnesota, 
 
283
  See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (“The threat of sanctions may deter their 
exercise [of First Amendment freedoms] almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions.”). 
284
  See Emerson, supra note 42, at 648; William T. Mayton, Toward a Theory of First Amendment 
Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 
67 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 263 (1982). 
285
 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558–59 (1975) (“The presumption 
against prior restraints is heavier—and the degree of protection broader—than that against limits on 
expression imposed by criminal penalties. Behind the distinction is a theory deeply etched in our law: a 
free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle 
them and all others beforehand.”). 
286
  James Madison discussed the impropriety of the distinction between prior restraint and 
subsequent punishment while castigating the Sedition Act in his Report on the Virginia Resolutions: 
The freedom of the press, under the common law, is . . . made to consist in an exemption from all 
previous restraint on printed publications, by persons authorized to inspect or prohibit them. It 
appears to the committee that this idea of the freedom of the press can never be admitted to be the 
American idea of it; since a law inflicting penalties on printed publications would have a similar 
effect with a law authorizing a previous restraint on them. It would seem a mockery to say that no 
laws should be passed preventing publications from being made, but that laws might be passed for 
punishing them in case they should be made. 
James Madison, Madison’s Reports on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL 
STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE 
GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 546, 569 (Jonathan Elliot ed., J. B. Lippincott & 
Co. 2d. ed. 1876) (1863); see also Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98 n.12 (1940) (citing same). 
287
  John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 430 (1983). 
288
  But see 5 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
§ 20.16(c) (4th ed. 2008) (arguing that the difference between prior restraint and subsequent punishment 
is that the former prevents speech from ever reaching the public but the latter does not). 
289
  See, e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550, 553 (1993). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 310 
where Chief Justice Hughes approvingly cited to William Blackstone.290 
However, both Blackstone and Chief Justice Hughes discussed the 
dichotomy in the context of unprotected speech, neither anticipating that 
subsequent punishment would be used to punish and therefore suppress 
protected speech.291 
The Court made clear its desire to prohibit subsequent punishment for 
protected speech in Thornhill v. Alabama.292 There the Court held 
unconstitutional an Alabama antilabor union statute that forbade “nearly 
every practicable, effective means” of publicly communicating “the nature 
and causes of a labor dispute.”293 In reaching that conclusion, it noted that 
the statute “readily lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement by 
local prosecuting officials, against particular groups deemed to merit their 
displeasure, [and] results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all 
freedom of discussion that might reasonably be regarded as within its 
purview.”294 The Court found that subsequent punishment was a form of 
prior restraint in Thornhill because the statute was being selectively 
enforced to punish a certain type of speech, thereby discouraging that 
speech from occurring in the first place.295 
The distinction between prior restraint and subsequent punishment is 
particularly problematic with the advent of mobile phone technology that 
allows any member of the public to share content with a large audience at a 
 
290
  283 U.S. 697, 713–14 (1931) (“The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free 
state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from 
censure for criminal matter when published.” (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151) 
(internal quotation mark omitted)). 
291
  “Protected activity” is “[c]onduct that is permitted or encouraged by a statute or constitutional 
provision, and for which the actor may not be legally retaliated against.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1343 (9th ed. 2009). In the First Amendment context, “protected speech” cannot be constitutionally 
suppressed by the Government. Blackstone argues that punishing speech after it occurs is sometimes 
“necessary for the preservation of peace and good order,” 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*152, which is analogous to the modern unprotected status of speech that would constitute “incitement 
to imminent lawless action,” see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969). In @ear, Chief Justice 
Hughes also appeared to limit permissible subsequent punishment of speech to unprotected 
communication and not “harmless publications.” @ear, 283 U.S. at 715. Thus, Chief Justice Hughes was 
stating that a subsequent punishment for unprotected speech is not a form of prior restraint, while the 
same is not true if the speech is protected. Moreover, Chief Justice Hughes specifically noted that 
“publication of censure of public officers and charges of official misconduct” is a form of “cherished” 
protected speech. Id. at 717. Given the harm that Blackstone’s definition of prior restraint can cause to 
free expression, it is no wonder Thomas Jefferson believed “Blackstone had done more towards the 
suppression of liberties of man than all the millions of men in arms of Bonaparte.” GEOFFREY R. STONE, 
PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 42–43 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
292
  310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
293
  Id. at 104. 
294
  Id. at 97–98 (emphasis added). 
295
  See id. at 101–02 (“The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution 
embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without 
previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.”). 
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relatively low cost.296 The unpredictability and sheer volume of potential 
speakers significantly weakens the government’s ability to prevent 
undesired speech from reaching the public. This is where the threat of 
subsequent punishment becomes useful as a form of prior restraint: while 
the government cannot realistically prevent every video or photo from being 
posted to the Internet, it can suppress speech by means of a policy of 
punishment.297 Consistent enforcement of such a policy will eventually 
make the public wary of engaging in that type of speech, ultimately ending 
it altogether.298 In addition, the quantity of information people can receive 
on a daily basis is staggering, making it harder for a single story or piece of 
information to reach its target audience.299 Thus, a message is more likely to 
be received the more frequently it is sent; if the government can enforce a 
statute that by subsequent punishment impedes receipt of those messages, 
they might never reach their intended audience. 
Furthermore, when the messages are important to police officers and 
prosecutors—as videos depicting police misconduct certainly are—efforts 
to suppress them become much more direct. For example, “[s]pecific 
warnings of prosecution from law enforcement officials create . . . [a] 
focused threat, and indeed, such threats have been a favored mode of 
suppression.”300 Or, threats might be abandoned in favor of openly and 
actively prosecuting individuals that record the police.301 This sends a clear 
message to the public that any form of resistance to or documentation of 
police wrongdoing could subject that person to criminal sanctions.302 Thus, 
 
296
  See Kreimer, supra note 26, at 344 (“In the emerging digital environment, broadly available and 
marginally costless image capture provides potential access to public dialogue for individuals and 
groups without firm economic or political bases or established public credibility.”). 
297
  The police have a strong incentive to prevent negative speech about their conduct because even 
one negative video can harm their reputation with the public, Eric S. Jefferis et al., The Effect of a 
Videotaped Arrest on Public Perceptions of Police Use of Force, 25 J. CRIM. JUST. 381, 391 (1997), and 
the absence of public trust can significantly hinder their ability to police the community, see FOSDICK, 
supra note 195, at 365 (“Without the cooperation of the public, the police themselves cannot 
successfully attack the problem of crime.”). 
298
  Mayton, supra note 284, at 263 (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 63–64 
(1963)). 
299
  See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 33, at 921 (explaining one problem with “communicative 
abundance” is “[t]he proliferation of accessible, but also often competing and conflicting accounts” of 
events); Nicholas Carr, Is Google Making Us Stupid?, THE ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2008, at 57 (“Even 
when I’m not working, I’m as likely as not to be foraging in the Web’s info-thickets—reading and 
writing e-mails, scanning headlines and blog posts, watching videos and listening to podcasts, or just 
tripping from link to link to link.”). 
300
  Mayton, supra note 284, at 265 (footnote omitted). 
301
  See Shin, supra note 8. 
302
  Commonwealth v. Hyde, 750 N.E.2d 963, 976 (Mass. 2001) (Marshall, C.J., dissenting) (“[The 
public’s role as watchdog] cannot be performed if citizens must fear criminal reprisals when they seek to 
hold government officials responsible by recording—secretly recording on occasion—an interaction 
between a citizen and a police officer.”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 312 
citizens who would otherwise want to record police conduct might decline 
to do so rather than risk prosecution.303 
Recording the police is precisely the type of activity that American 
prior restraint doctrine—and the First Amendment generally—seeks to 
protect. Although criticism (or praise) of the police by means of video 
footage is protected speech,304 some argue that it should still be prohibited 
because allowing it will have negative policy consequences that outweigh 
the benefits of improved oversight. The next section rebuts some of those 
policy arguments. 
IV. POLICY 
This Part presents four policy arguments that support allowing citizens 
to record police officers’ conduct: (1) the inherently public nature of police 
work undermines the argument that more widespread recording of the 
police would “overdeter” their actions, (2) the potential dangers associated 
with recording the police can be mitigated and do not outweigh the public 
benefit of a monitored police force, (3) allowing citizens to record the 
police could actually increase, rather than decrease, public trust in law 
enforcement, and (4) the risk that some videos can be inaccurate or even 
falsified could be minimized with police “counter-recording” and libel 
lawsuits. 
A. “Overdeterrence” 
The inherently public nature of policing and its well-established 
exposure to the public for observation and criticism make overdeterrence 
resulting from citizens recording police conduct unlikely. The term 
overdeterrence is used because videotaping the police should deter 
improper actions but not prevent officers from addressing situations that 
require attention. However, recording the police with the aim of achieving 
safe streets and genteel officers may put officers in a quandary, with the 
constant fear of reprisal driving them to inaction.305 This could make their 
jobs more dangerous because criminals might detect an arresting officer 
showing intentional restraint or being “over-cautious,”306 and therefore 
become more likely to use violence. 
Although widespread citizen recording might occasionally make an 
officer hesitate, proper training could mitigate this response.307 Even in the 
 
303
  See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-402(b) (LexisNexis 2010). 
304
  See Kreimer, supra note 26, at 370–74. 
305
  See CLAUDE L. VINCENT, POLICE OFFICER 66 (1990). 
306
  See Benjamin J. Goold, Public Area Surveillance and Police Work: The Impact of CCTV on 
Police Behaviour and Autonomy, 1 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 191, 197 (2003) (arguing that deterrence 
might make the police overly cautious and more vulnerable). 
307
  CATO Video, supra note 22, at 43:40 (statement of Maj. Neal Franklin, former Maryland State 
Police and Baltimore City Police Officer). The actual video footage captured by citizens can also be 
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absence of such training, it is more likely that “most officers will [not] shirk 
their clear duty to enforce the law and fight crime simply because there is a 
channel through which citizens can be assured of a fair hearing of 
grievances.”308 The risk of overdeterrence decreases even more if the police 
also do their own recording because it enables them to defend their actions 
if they are improperly accused of misconduct. 
B. Recording Can Be Dangerous 
Citizen-recording of the police could—but need not—subject the 
recorder or the officer to danger. For example, a citizen could be exposed to 
considerable risk if a police officer mistakes a camera or cellular phone for 
a gun and shoots the recorder as a result of a split-second decision.309 Or, a 
videographer could potentially distract an officer, leading to an error that 
harms an investigation or results in injury.310 However, the police are 
frequently called upon to make split-second decisions in potentially 
dangerous and distracting circumstances. Allowing citizens to record police 
conduct noninvasively is not necessarily more distracting or dangerous than 
anything else the police might encounter.311 
In addition, many police are already consistently recorded. Not only do 
some police departments record officers using car-mounted cameras,312 but 
some also even permit television shows like COPS to videotape them for 
 
used to help train officers and prevent misconduct. Skehill, supra note 55, at 1004. In addition, the 
citizens themselves can be trained to safely and effectively record police conduct without interfering 
with police work. See Will Connaghan, Commentary, ACLU Will Help Citizens Be ‘Vigilant,’ DAILY 
RECORD (St. Louis, Mo.), June 20, 2007, at 1. 
308
  See GROSS & REITMAN, supra note 191, at 28 (arguing in favor of creating independent civilian 
review boards for police). The arguments made by police unions against civilian review boards, id., 
were remarkably similar to current public policy arguments against allowing citizens to freely record 
police conduct. 
309
  See, e.g., Bootie Cosgrove-Mather, Cops: Phone Looked Like A Gun, CBS NEWS (June 11, 
2003), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/06/11/eveningnews/main558226.shtml (“Police videotape 
showed the suspect finally getting out of his car and pointing a shiny chrome object in what police took 
to be a shooter’s stance. Shots were fired, and 25-year-old Marquise Hudspeth was killed; shot eight 
times in the back.”); Nicole Tsong & Warren Cornwall, Boy, 13, Shot After Officer Mistakes Cell For 
Weapon, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007, at A1 (“A Seattle police officer shot a 13-year-old twice in the 
leg early Sunday, and police said he had mistaken the boy’s cellphone for a weapon.”).  
310
  Jane Musgrave, Mom Who Videotaped Boynton Cops Sues over Arrest, PALM BEACH POST (July 
30, 2010, 9:59 PM), http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/mom-who-videotaped-boynton-cops-sues-
over-arrest-833123.html; see also Brief of Appellees, supra note 35 (recognizing the possibility that 
recording the police may be distracting); Goold, supra note 306, at 194–95 (same). 
311
  If it is, then modified training procedures can teach the police to adjust to the observation. See, 
e.g., ROB C. MAWBY, POLICING IMAGES 160 (2002); Goldsmith, supra note 33, at 926; Skehill, supra 
note 55, at 1004. 
312
  See, e.g., Lisa Halverstadt, Glendale Police Cars Will Get Dash-Mounted Cameras, 
AZCENTRAL.COM (Oct. 18, 2010, 8:25 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/community/glendale/articles/
2010/10/18/20101018glendale-police-car-cameras.html. 
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the purposes of entertainment.313 Surely police officers would not expose 
themselves (and by extension their families and friends) to unnecessary 
danger for the sake of entertainment. Nor can one argue that these two 
examples share the element of awareness and are therefore safer than 
citizens recording the police with cell phones because an awareness of 
ubiquitous citizen recording can be instilled in young officers during 
training.314 
C. Institutionalization of Distrust 
The police depend on the public’s cooperation to conduct their police 
work effectively,315 and as such, they fear an “institutionalization of 
distrust.”316 Evidence suggests that the public reacts negatively to footage of 
police misconduct,317 making people less likely to cooperate with police 
when called upon to do so. This problem is exacerbated when a large 
number of people view the footage in a short time period,318 in a “viral” 
YouTube video, for example. Some argue that once the public develops 
negative feelings towards the police it is nearly impossible to reverse those 
feelings319 because these videos, once posted, do not simply disappear from 
the Internet.320 
However, if the police footage reinforces the desired belief that the 
police generally keep the public safe and protected, then recording and 
sharing footage of police conduct may actually improve the public’s 
perception of them.321 This, in turn, may increase the public’s willingness to 
cooperate in police investigations. In fact, actively suppressing video 
recording of the police might also silence positive messages of police 
heroism and bravery,322 which does not help the reputation the police are 
 
313
  See State v. Graber, No. 12-K-10-647, 2010 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 7, at *17 (Md. Cir. Ct. Sept. 27, 
2010). 
314
  See Skehill, supra note 5, at 1004. 
315
  See, e.g., VICTOR E. KAPPELER & LARRY K. GAINES, COMMUNITY POLICING 171 (Shirley 
Decker-Lucke & Gregory Chalson eds., 6th ed. 2011) (“Citizens who do not trust the police are less 
likely to report crime and to participate in developing solutions to problems.”); James Hawdon & John 
Ryan, Police-Resident Interactions and Satisfaction With Police: An Empirical Test of Community 
Policing Assertions, 14 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 55, 55–56 (2003) (“Effective policing depends on 
resident support.”). 
316
  Goldsmith, supra note 33, at 931 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
317
  Jefferis et al., supra note 297, at 391. 
318
  Skehill, supra note 5, at 999 n.141; Graber Video II, supra note 2. 
319
  See Wasserman, supra note 77, at 647. 
320
  See Goldsmith, supra note 33, at 925 (“Video capture of images for mass dissemination, repeat 
viewing and popular debate enables mass mobilization of affect and discussion of particular events, as 
the Rodney King example and many subsequent cases have shown. . . . The video record typically 
remains accessible for later review.”). 
321
  See Luna, supra note 34, at 1120. 
322
  See, e.g., Gregg Burrage, Tampa Police Officers Rescue Kitten from Sewer, ABC ACTION NEWS 
(Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.abcactionnews.com/dpp/news/region_tampa/tampa-police-officers-rescue-
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justifiably trying to cultivate and sustain. Even if some of the videos are 
negative, arresting the recorder makes the police look even worse, further 
undermining their efforts to curry favor with the public. Allowing citizens 
to record the police is more likely to decrease the potential for “negative” 
videos because the act of recording will itself serve to decrease instances of 
police misconduct323—more transparency creates additional means for 
recourse in the (increasingly unlikely) event that misconduct does occur.324 
D. Video Is Inaccurate 
Finally, some argue that the accuracy of the video footage captured is a 
concern. Admittedly, the camera is a technologically limited instrument for 
capturing an event or series of events.325 Some also argue that the accuracy 
of the footage may be limited by the intentional or unintentional bias of the 
videographer:326 the camera operator may start the filming too late, focus on 
a particular element of the scene, or stop the filming too early,327 ultimately 
creating an incomplete but highly persuasive depiction of what occurred.328 
One remedy for the police officers’ fear that false footage will spread 
and harm their reputations is that police officers, as citizens, can file 
lawsuits against other citizens who publish intentionally inaccurate 
footage.329 This serves two useful purposes without infringing First 
Amendment rights. First, the threat of being sued for publishing distorting 
footage might discourage wanton recording of police officers. Second, it 
would encourage the police to record their interactions with the public to 
create positive counterevidence. 
Actively encouraging the police to record their interactions with the 
public benefits all parties involved because it increases the likelihood that 
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the “entire” scene is captured.330 This evidence would be useful not only to 
police in their efforts to disclaim improper conduct, but also to the citizens 
who experienced the conduct. There are a number of ways the police could 
record these interactions to obtain counterevidence, some of which are 
already being implemented: car-mounted cameras,331 cameras on Tasers332 
and guns,333 and even cameras mounted on the officers’ bodies.334 This 
additional footage can mitigate accuracy issues because it will paint a far 
more complete picture than footage from any single source.335 
In sum, “no matter how well the police do their job . . . many 
people . . . will view them with animosity.”336 It is therefore better to have 
more information than less, because more members of the public will view 
the police positively when there is greater evidence showing that most 
police officers are properly and justly doing their jobs. And, when evidence 
shows that the police cannot be trusted, the police will have every incentive 
to improve their performance. 
CONCLUSION 
The police protect and serve, but in the rare cases in which they do not, 
they are not entitled to violate the Constitution by cloaking their misconduct 
in secrecy. Individuals have a constitutionally protected right to record and 
disseminate video footage of their police officers. This right is encapsulated 
in the First Amendment’s protection of free speech and a free press, and the 
rights to gather information, redress grievances, expressive conduct, and be 
free from prior restraint. Court rulings (and legislative activity) should 
affirm this right337 and, ideally, set standards under which the police may 
justifiably and constitutionally prevent citizens from capturing and 
transmitting video footage. Although there are facially valid reasons to 
suppress this type of speech, those arguments are outweighed by arguments 
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